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South Africa is a country with a kaleidoscope of cultural, ethnic, and racial identities. As 
such it is not yet a nation-state and is struggling with competing demands of difference 
and unity involving different races and different ethnic groups.  All this is taking place 
against a background of a government concerned with constructing a durable ‘rainbow 
nation’ underpinned by principles of non-racialism, equality and common citizenship. 
The dangers of exclusive nationalism and even racism are alive in South Africa despite 
political rhetoric to the contrary. No wonder then that the mere launch of the Native Club 
in 2006 in South Africa under the theme of Where Are the Natives?: The Black 
Intelligentsia Today, as a new forum for black South African intelligentsia, provoked 
wide spread debate from the academic and political fraternity that even implicated 
President Thabo Mbeki as the brains behind the project. The debates revolved around key 
and sometimes very sensitive issues of race, citizenship, inclusion and exclusion in a 
country that has just emerged from inhuman apartheid legacy and a country that was 
promising to be a successful model of stable and pluralist liberal democracy in Africa. 
The Native Club was established amidst intense debates among intellectuals touching on 
the limits and dangers of neo-liberalism as well as the dangers and limits of populist and 
exclusive African nationalism. Currently the Native Club is housed under the roof of the 
Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA) in Pretoria (Tshwane) and it has a website which 
spells out its mission and objectives in very brief terms. This working paper takes a 
politico-historical approach in its endeavour to understand and define the essence of the 
Native Club going beyond the surface media exchanges that have characterised its 
launch, grounding the debate more earlier debates over, race, class and the national 
democratic revolution to reveal the historical ‘rooted ness’ of nativism and populism.  
 
The Native Club is a product and a symptom of deeper contradictory and ambiguous 
embers of a fragmented, bifurcated and complex liberation tradition fashioned by the 
equally bifurcated and ambiguous settler colonialism and apartheid. Its roots must be 
traced and linked to nationalist politics dating back to the formation of the South African 
Native National Congress (SANNC) in 1912 and the subsequent split of the African 
National Congress (ANC) into the Pan-African Congress (PAC) in 1959. Thus the Native 
Club is here understood as a reflection of the antimonies of black nationalist thought that 
was influenced by a coalescence of different but related liberation traditions such as Pan-
Africanism, Garveyism, Populism, Negritude, Socialism, and Marxism.  As such, it 
cannot be studied and understood as a phenomenon of 2006. This working paper’s task 
involves historicising, theorising, conceptualising and contextualising the Native Club 
within the evolving body politic of South Africa while at the same time revealing broader 
hidden ideological meanings, essence and dangers of nativism in post-apartheid South 
Africa. The politics and debates sparked by the Native Club also resonates with the 
current crises within the ANC and the Tripartite Alliance and the whole post-1994 
malaise crystallising around ideological, class and racial cleavages that are characterizing 
the second phase of South African democratic consolidation. This study is largely 
interpretive in its search for a comprehensive definition of the Native Club and making 
sense of Native Club in a post-colonial, post-settler and post-apartheid society in Africa.  
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I am a native of South Africa, and therefore I would have no problem in 
approaching the Native Club to seek participation in its activities.1
  
Shaped by the immanent logic of colonialism, Third Word nationalism could not 
escape from reproducing racial and ethnic discrimination; a price to be paid by 
the coloniser as well as the colonised selves.2
 
When we consider the narratives of decolonisation, we encounter rhetorics in 
which ‘nativism’ in one form or another is evident. Instead of disciplining these, 
theoretical whip in hand, as a catalogue of epistemological error, of essentialist 
mystifications, as a masculinist appropriation of dissent, as no more than an 
anti-racist racism, etc., I want  to consider what is to be gained by an 
unsententious interrogation of such articulations which, if often driven by 
negative passion, cannot be reduced to mere inveighing against iniquities or a 
repetition of the canonical terms of imperialism’s framework.3
 
In the context of a former settler colony, a single citizenship for settlers and 
natives can only be the result of an overall metamorphosis whereby erstwhile 
colonisers and colonised are politically reborn as equal members of a single 
political community. The word reconciliation cannot capture this 
metamorphosis…This is about establishing, for the first time, a political order 
based on consent and not conquest. It is about establishing a political community 
of equal and consenting citizens.4
 
In post-apartheid epoch, while people’s expectations have been heightened, a 
realisation that delivery is not immediate has meant that discontent and 
indignation are at the peak. People are more conscious of their deprivation than 
ever before…This is the ideal situation for a phenomenon like xenophobia to take 
root and flourish. South Africa’s transition to democracy has exposed the 
unequal distribution of resources and wealth in the country.5
 
Though we are Africans, many South Africans seem to have an identity crisis. 
Through our dress, music, cuisine, role models and reference points we seem to 
be clones of Americans and Europeans. The Native Club will grapple with this 
important matter so that there should evolve Africans who are truly native than 
exotic.6  
 
                                                 
1 President Thabo Mbeki quoted in Louis Freedberg, ‘Return of the ‘n’ word,’ in 
http://www.nativeclub.org/shared/news/article.asp?id=208
2 Kuan-Hsing Chen, ‘Introduction: The Decolonization Question,’ in Kuan-Hsing Chen (ed.), Trajectories: 
Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, (Taylor and Francis, London, 1998), p. 14. 
3 Benita Parry, ‘Resistance Theory/Theorising Resistance or Two Cheers for Nativism,’ in Francis Barker, 
Peter Hulme and Magaret Iversen (eds.), Colonial Discourse/Postcolonial Theory, (University of 
Manchester Press, Manchester, 1994), p. 176.  
4 Mahmood Mamdani, ‘When Does a Settler Become a Native? Reflections on the Roots of Citizenship in 
Equatorial and South Africa,’ (Text of Inaugural Lecturer delivered as A. C. Jordan Professor of African 
Studies, University of Cape Town, Wednesday 13 May 1998). 
5 C. Tshitereke, ‘Xenophobia and Relative Deprivation,’ in Crossings, Volume 3, Number 2, (1999), pp. 4-
5. 
6 Statement by Titus Mafolo, senior adviser to President Thabo Mbeki and founding Chairman of the 
Native Club.  
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Introduction 
The South Asian historian Sumit Sarkar made this important intellectual comment that 
‘unimportant events of no obvious consequence which stick out and refuse to fit into any 
of the established patterns of historical reconstruction’ are valuable insofar as they ‘afford 
oblique entry points into social history and can throw light upon dimensions obscured by 
dominant—all too often teleological analytical frameworks.’7 This statement is relevant 
for the present study because to some people the launch of the Native Club in South 
Africa in May 2006 was not an important event at all while to others it was just dismissed 
out rightly as ‘April Fools’ joke’ and a move to deflect attention from failings of the 
state.8 To some, it was just interpreted simplistically as ‘black racism’ and yet others 
described it as a form of ‘stirring a dark brew’ comparable to some nineteenth century 
millenarian fatal and false prophecies that influenced Africans into resorting to some 
irrational behaviours that cost them lives and material wealth.9 However, they were some 
who immediately defined the Native Club in non-dismissive and broad terms like Eddy 
Maloka who wrote that the ‘Yet, the Native Club is simply a movement, or rather a 
network, of a section of our country’s intelligentsia which is ‘gatvol’ with the dominance 
that whites continue to enjoy in our knowledge production sector.’10 Maloka went on to 
situate the Native Club within the broader African liberation traditions arguing that the 
agenda of national transformation cannot ignore the realm of ideas where intellectual 
debates and national discourse is articulated. In this study, the formation of the Native 
Club is not seen as an isolated event, but as a consequence of some embers which have 
been burning since the beginning of the struggle against apartheid and is situated 
historically within the broader terrain of power contestations and continuous reflections 
by different sections of South African society on the gains of the anti-apartheid struggle, 
post-apartheid development failures and disappointments as well as the future direction 
of democratic social and political transformation at this crucial second decade of South 
African democratic consolidation. 
 
The launch of the Native Club brought to the surface some key issues that require 
systematic historical analysis like contested imaginations of liberation, contradictory 
visions of citizenship and democracy as well as equally contested imaginations of the 
nature of the post-apartheid nation-state itself. During the first decade of democracy, 
many black South Africans had pinned their hopes for change on the Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) and the socialist inspired Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) that witnessed the construction of some low cost RDP houses among 
other few early achievements of the ANC government.  Unfortunately, BEE ended up as 
a package benefiting the elite black South Africans directly connected to ANC political 
                                                 
7 Sumit Sarkar, ‘The Kalki-Avatar of Bikrampur: A Village Scandal in Early Twentieth Century Bengal,’ in 
Ranajit Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies VI: Writings on South Asian History and Society, (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1992), p. 3. 
8 Jonathan Jansen, ‘Native Club: A Dangerous Move to Deflect Attention from State Failings,’ in Sunday 
Times, 28 May 2006.  
9 Democratic Alliance National Spokesperson, Motlajo Theetjen, ‘Native Club Racist,’ in Financial Mail, 
26 May 2006 and Achille Mbembe, ‘Stirring a Dark Brew that Echoes Nongwawuse’s Fatal Prophecy,’ in 
Sunday Times, 24 June 2006.  
10 Eddy Maloka, ‘The Native Club and the National Democratic Project,’ in www.sundaytimes.co.za
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power structures such as Cyril Ramaphosa and others and the black poor remained mired 
in poverty and disease. The RDP was soon overtaken and replaced by the neo-liberal 
Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR), that took a form of the much hated 
World Bank (WB)-International Monetary Fund (IMF) concocted Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPS) of the 1980s and 1990s in Africa emphasising economic growth 
whose benefits hardly trickled down to the poor communities of South Africa.11 The 
recent adoption of Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) 
still symbolises the further drift of the ANC government into neo-liberal path of 
development. Through GEAR and ASGISA, the ANC made a swing from the little left of 
its Left leaning tradition to the Right, implementing an orthodox macroeconomic policy 
which stressed deficit reduction, accelerated economic growth, tight monetary policy and 
trade liberalisation.12   
 
These ideological and economic policy shifts are taking place in the midst of some 
apparent failures to scale down poverty among the poor. Signs are clear from the public 
debates that not all was rosy and smooth within the process of transforming South 
African society from apartheid to democracy. The society is saturated with frustrations as 
well as optimisms depending on one’s station in life. The white community has all the 
reasons to be happy about the transition because their economic power was left intact. 
This reality created political schisms within the tripartite alliance, revolving not only 
around succession and the fate of Jacob Zuma but more importantly relating to issues of 
class, nationalism, citizenship, legacies of a left tradition and contestations of the history 
of the ANC itself. Unless one reads all these recent developments backward they will 
remain baffling and unclear because they have a long history behind them that need 
careful analysis. Even though some historians like Frederick Cooper are critical of 
backward-gazing approaches to history stating that contexts gets lost in which concepts 
emerged, I will try here to remain sensitive to the contexts,  disjunctures between  the 
frameworks of the past actors  and the present interpretations while simultaneously 
emphasising the issues of continuity and replays of ideological schisms in the past and 
present South Africa.13 The formation of the Native Club is part of the symptom of some 
the deep rooted ideological and class schisms that can only be interpreted meaningfully 
by quarrying systematically into the various events and traditions carrying similar 
messages and contributing to the formation of such a phenomenon as well as 
interrogation of different political strands nursing and sustaining such thinking 
considered by others as dangerous and supported by some as emancipatory. 
 
Therefore, this study ventures into the theoretical and definitional issues related to the 
politics of nativism, traces the antimonies of black nationalist thought revealing  how 
such liberation thought as Negritude, Marxism, radical Pan-Africanism, Garveyism, 
Afro-radicalism as well as African cultural-populism became incubators of nativism, how 
                                                 
11 On poverty and inequality in South Africa see Sampie Terreblanche, A History of Inequality in South 
Africa, 1652-2002, (University of Natal Press, Pietermaritburg, 2002).  
12 John Weeks, ‘Stuck in Low GEAR? Macroeconomic Policy in South Africa, 1996-1998,’ in Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, N. 6, (November 1999), pp. 795-811. 
13 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History, (University of California Press,  
Berkeley and Los Angels, 2005), pp. 18-19.  
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and settler colonialism (apartheid) created binaries of settlers and natives that are 
currently creating complex post-apartheid dilemmas including the questions of natives 
and non-natives, entitlements and indigeneity, culture and rights.14  The study moves on 
explore the foundational myth of the ‘new South Africa’ and the ‘rainbow nation’ 
emphasising that the triumphant non-racial ideology became the accepted public 
transcript forcing the populist Afro-radical thinking to take a dangerous form of hidden 
transcript always ready to re-emerge as public transcript. The emphasis on the role of 
native intellectuariat as the progressive force and the emergence of the Native Club that is 
currently featuring as an native intellectual project of a few black intelligentsia is one 
indicator of the resurgence of black populist thought to occupy the centre of politics once 
more. The resurgence of black thought dovetails with the emergence of articulation and 
re-articulation of the national democratic revolution in the context of the second decade 
of South African democracy punctuated with a popular sense of betrayal. This sense of 
betrayal among the masses feeds into resurgence of populist politics crystallising around 
what has come to be known as the ‘Jacob Zuma Saga’ and its ripple effects on the 
succession debate in South Africa. The study locates the politics of nativism in between 
and betwixt fault-lines of reformist neo-liberal agenda and Afro-radical Africanist and 
populist revolution- oriented agenda, both co-existing uneasily and tendentiously within 
the ANC.   
 
Defining and Framing the Research Problem 
The launch of the Native Club in South Africa is used as an entry point into a broader 
analysis of nation-building and citizenship challenges and problems that are constantly 
threatening to derail the non-racial ethos of the ‘rainbow nation.’ While in post-apartheid 
South Africa, the challenges of nation-building and creation of common citizenship out 
of multinational society has not yet erupted into violence that has rocked such countries 
as Zimbabwe, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda  and Burundi in 
recent years, there is clear ascendancy of Africanist thought in South Africa demanding 
the recreation of South Africa into an African nation under black African hegemony.15 
Within the ruling ANC there is clear intensity of African feeling and the strengthening of 
Africanist tendencies within the movement.  
 
It is within this background that the launch of the Native Club in 2006 is just a corner of a 
bigger Africanist ice-bag still lurking within the ANC and the broader South African 
society in this second decade of consolidation of South Africa democracy.  Those 
scholars like Lwazi Siyabonga Lushaba who are continuing to pander to the celebratory  
mood and myth of the South African nation-building experiment as exceptional from 
other former settler colonies to the extent of arguing that the ANC adopted civic 
nationalism and the ‘question of citizenship in post-apartheid era was resolved as early as 
1955 with the adoption of the Freedom Charter which categorically states that ‘South 
                                                 
14 Harri and Francis B. Nyamnjoh (eds.), Rights and the Politics of Recognition in Africa, (Zed Books, 
London and New York, 2004). 
15 Irina Filatova, ‘The Rainbow Against the African Sky Or African Hegemony in a Multi-Cultural 
Context,’ in Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa, Volume 34, (1997), pp. 47-56.  
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Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white.’16 This perspective has been 
overtaken by events on the ground and is glossing over continuing internal dualities 
pitting the Charterists against black republicans within the ANC whose embers are 
continuing burning threatening to burn not the anchorages of the Tripartite Alliance but 
also the weak foundation myth of the rainbow nation.  While it is true that secular and 
civic nationalism as well as civic conception of citizenship constitute the religion of the 
South African state, underneath this state religion lies continuing tensions and differing 
visions of the nature of the state and the complexion of the nation, raising questions of 
who is a native and who is not, as well as the teleology of the national democratic 
revolution. The Freedom Charter did not settle once and for all the citizenship question 
and the broader national question.  Since the adoption of the Freedom Charter, the ANC 
has produced other documents including  Nation-Formation and Nation-Building 
Challenges, A Better Life For All: Working Together For Jobs, Peace and Freedom 
(1994), Building the Foundation for A Better Life (1997), and Constitutional Guidelines 
for a Democratic South Africa and many others, which combine to reflect a continuous 
struggle within the ANC to find a more realistic and more acceptable vision for a durable 
South African nation-state and the continuing existence of an unfinished or unresolved 
national question.17
 
A key contour of South African political evolution that has not been subjected to 
systematic analysis is that of the  rising tide of Africanism within and outside the ANC 
and its notion of the liberation struggle (anti-apartheid) as a black emancipatory 
movement since the departure of Nelson Mandela from active politics. ANC documents 
on the national question stress the issue of the liberation of black people without 
necessarily precluding the reality of diversity of South African society for strategic and 
hegemonic purposes. At the centre of this stress on Africanism is the task of building a 
black bourgeoisie and to create an enabling environment for ‘the fast growth of a black 
middle strata,’ on the one hand and the nativist demand for a black republic on the 
other.18 That the ANC was throughout its existence dominated by Africanist thought is 
revealed by the fact that by 1969 when the Morogoro Consultative Conference of the 
ANC took place, there was strong opposition to the admission of non-Africans into the 
top posts of the ANC particularly the National Executive Council (NEC). It was not until 
1985 at the Kabwe Conference that non-Africans were admitted into NEC.19
 
A number of historical developments help to explain the continuous ascendancy of 
Africanism in South African politics. Firstly, is the flowering of multiple African cultures 
and languages that were previously denigrated by apartheid. Secondly, is the realities of 
the first democratic elections in South Africa and its implications of the ANC. Despite 
                                                 
16 Lwazi S. Lushaba, ‘Nationalism and the Problem of Citizenship in Multi-National African States: South 
Africa and Nigeria Compared,’ (Research proposal/concept paper submitted to the African Studies Centre , 
Leiden, for a Visiting Fellowship Program, n.d.), p. 14. 
17 African National Congress, A Better Life for All: Working Together for Jobs, Peace and Freedom, (ANC 
Publication, Johannesburg, 1994), African National Congress, Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic 
South Africa, (ANC Publication, Lusaka, n.d.), and African National Congress, Building the Foundation for 
A Better Life, (Draft Strategy and Tactics Document of the ANC, (ANC Publication, Johannesburg, 1997). 
18 Filativa, ‘The Rainbow Against the African Sky,’ p. 48. 
19 Ibid 
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the ANC’s particular stress on non-racialism before the elections, the voting was racially 
divided and the ANC come out of it more overwhelmingly ‘African’ than it seemed to 
have hoped for.20  Thirdly, the collapse of the white far right-wing threat to the ANC that 
culminated in the eventual swallowing of some members of the National Party (NP) by 
the ANC and the withdrawal of some into the Democratic Alliance (DA) under Tony 
Leon, opened space for the embers of Africanism to surge to the open within the ANC. 
Fourthly, through the resurgence and ascendancy of Africanism within the ANC, the 
ruling party was able to still the thunder from the Pan-African Congress (PAC). Even 
more importantly, the moderate old guard that crafted the Freedom Charter in 1955 like 
Govan Mbeki, Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu, Raymond Mhlaba and others have died. 
Nelson Mandela the leading figure within those in favour of a multi-racial democracy is 
now too old and his influence on politics is now symbolic than practical.21 The Mbeki 
orchestrated philosophy of African Renaissance and the popularisation of the ideology of 
ubuntu all indicates the resurgence of Africanist thought and how the ANC continues to 
survive by stealing and accommodating any strong ideology that seem to be popular at 
any given time.22 Even the ANC driven foreign policy is couch in purely Africanist terms 
of African Renaissance laced with some strong doses of adherence to democracy and 
human rights. 
 
But up to now the ANC has remained strategically ambivalent regarding its approach to 
national question, remaining caught up between and betwixt the embers of African 
indigenous definition of citizenship and those of neo-liberal civic definition of 
citizenship. This ambiguity has been a trade mark and a survival tactic of the ANC 
enabling it to mobilise across race, class and ethnicity. Nativism is definable as an 
outgrowth of the resurgence of  Africanism within the ANC and in South African society 
in general. It takes the form of black natives asserting and claiming their exclusive 
citizenship rights and entitlements as a majority constituency in South Africa. Therefore, 
there is need for a more, careful and nuanced exploration of both the legacies of settler 
colonialism and African nationalism as the historical background from which citizenship 
conflicts emerge. Only that way can one understand the contemporary struggles within 
the ANC that are feeding into the rise of nativist politics at this crucial phase of 
democratic consolidation in South Africa. 
 
Since 1994, a political approach to nation-building that is not well integrated with  
cultural and economic approach, predicated on ‘unity in diversity’/ ‘rainbowism’ has 
carried the imagination of the nation and citizenship, but the second decade of democracy 
is revealing the limits of this approach. This is revealed not only by the formation of such 
exclusivist networks as the Native Club, but also by the controversy it generated, ANC 
succession debates and the mobilisation on ethnic lines, Afrikaner and Coloured 
expressions of economic, political and cultural marginalisation and these groups’ 
                                                 
20 Ibid, p. 53. 
21 On the influences that made Nelson Mandela lean more on conciliatory politics see Tom Lodge, ‘Code of 
Conduct: Mandela’s Politics’ (Paper presented at the African Studies Centre, Leiden, 30 November 2006). 
22 Deputy President Thabo Mbeki’s Speech entitled ‘The African Renaissance, South Africa and the 
World,’ (Delivered at the United Nations University, 9 April 1998) where he emphasized the need to 
‘rediscover ourselves’ as Africans. 
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problematic re-assertions of claims to exclusivity, the racial polarisation and identity 
politics in the Cape; racial tensions in schools and institutions of higher learning, 
exemplified by the ongoing racial conflict among black academics, on the one hand, and 
their white and Indian counterparts, at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKNZ) on the 
other. These developments are indeed symptomatic of structural weaknesses in the 
negotiated settlement that papered over deep-rooted cleavages, dichotomies, differences 
and binaries accentuated by apartheid.  
 
In summary terms, the central problem being investigated is that of different visions of 
liberation, democracy, citizenship and values defining a South African and the South 
African nation. It is an exploration of the complex issue of South African identity and the 
myth of South African exceptionalism. Why is radical black populist African thought 
continuing to co-exist uneasily and tendentiously with non-racial ethos within the ANC, 
thirteen years after the transition from apartheid to democracy? What is the danger and 
logic of resurgence of Africanist thought with its nativist claims in a country like South 
Africa? Which historical and current realities feed and sustain nativist thinking in South 
Africa? Why are ‘natives restless’ and why are settlers panicking?  What are the linkages 
between the current politics, in particular the so-called ‘Jacob Zuma Saga’ and the 
tradition of liberation and ANC modus operandi? These are some of the key questions 
dealt with and explored in this study. I use a mixture of conceptual tools including C. R. 
D. Halisi’s concept of antimonies of black thought, Antonio Gramsci and Stuart Hall 
concept of  articulation and re-articulation of hegemonic struggles, Mahmood Mamdani’s 
concept of bifurcation of the colonial state into citizens and subjects and his challenging 
question of when does a settler becomes a native as well as Ernesto Laclau’s work on 
populism and James C. Scott’s concept of hidden and public transcripts.23 This study also 
benefited a lot in theoretical terms from the work of the following scholars: Frantz Fanon, 
Octave Mannoni, Albert Memmi, Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, Benita Parry, Kuan-
Hsing Chen, Achille Mbembe, Peter P. Ekeh, and Kwame Anthony Appiah, particularly 
relating to the colonial and decolonization issues as well as nativism and identity 
questions.24 These complex theoretical tools are deployed throughout the study whenever 
and wherever applicable and relevant to the core issues being explored. 
                                                 
23 C. R. D. Halisi, ‘From Liberation to Citizenship: Identity and Innovation in Black South African 
Thought’ in Society for Comparative Study of Society and History, 1997; Antonio Gramsci, Selections from 
the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, edited and translated by Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith, 
(Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971);  Stuart Hall, ‘Race, Articulation and Societies Structured in 
Dominance,’ in Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism, (UNESCO, Paris, 1980); Mahmood 
Mamdani, ‘When Does a Settler Become a Native? Reflections on the Roots of Citizenship in Equatorial 
and South Africa,’ (Text of Inaugural Lecture delivered as A.C. Jordan Professor of African Studies, 
University of Cape Town, Wednesday 13 May 1998); Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: 
Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, (Princeton, University Press, Princeton, 1996); 
Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda,  
(James Currey, Oxford, 2001);  Ernesto Laclau, ‘Towards a Theory of Populism,’ in E. Laclau (ed.), 
Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism,  (Verso, London, 1977) and 
James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, (Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1990).  
24 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, (Grove, New York, 1967);  Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the 
Earth, (Grove, New York, 1968); Albert Memmi, The Coloniser and the Colonised, (Beacon Press, Boston, 
1957); Octave Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonisation, (University of Michigan 
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Theories and Definitions of Nativism 
Nativism has been a subject of academic debate for some time across the world because it 
is both an old and a new phenomenon and it manifest itself in a variety of forms. Even 
dictionary definitions of nativism reflect its various versions understandable only within 
specific contexts. These include nativism as a socio-political position taken by those 
people who identify themselves as native-born, a belief in the importance of asserting an 
authentic ethnic identity, policy favouring native-born citizens over immigrants, 
perpetuating native cultures in opposition to acculturation, and a defence of native-born 
people predicated on a hostility to foreign-born as well as the desire to stop or slow 
immigration.25  
 
What is clear is that there is no one clear definition of nativism.  At one level, it can be 
defined as a nostalgic desire to return to the roots, particularly a return to indigenous pre-
colonial life in Africa that is assumed to have been uncorrupted by colonialism and 
modernity. At this level, African history, African cultures, African traditions and values 
are deliberately essentialized to counter Eurocentric and imperial ideologies of Western 
civilising mission. The nationalist project in Africa contained strong and fertile seeds of 
nativism in the sense that it entailed rolling back colonialism and giving back the power 
to govern to native black sons and daughters of the soil. African nationalist spirit 
valorised and idealised pre-colonial African past and many heroes were created to 
symbolised African spirit of resistance. Peter P. Ekeh has meticulously analysed African 
bourgeois ideologies of legitimation involving fighting ‘alien rulers on the basis of 
criteria introduced by the them.’26 The African bourgeois that spearheaded the nationalist 
struggle constantly used nativist argument to justify their right to replace white rulers to 
mobilise black masses. 
 
However, looked at broadly, nativism has no single parentage, no single origin, no single 
genealogy and is watered from many springs, some local, some regional and some global. 
Its roots are located in both the present and the past. It magnifies both local and global 
power politics and it reflects both crisis and some hope in people’s broader struggles for 
emancipation. The search for identity as well as justice remains at the centre of nativist 
politics across the globe. For one to understand the meaning and essence of nativism, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Press, Ann Arbor, 1990);  Kwame A. Appiah, In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture, 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992), Gayatri Spivak, The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, 
Dialogues, (Routledge, London, 1990);  Benita Parry, ‘Resistance Theory/Theorizing Resistance or Two 
Cheers for Nativism,’ in F. Barker at al (eds.), Colonial Discourse/Postcolonial Theory, (University of 
Manchester, 1994); Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 2001); 
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intellectual care is needed that goes beyond the present ahistorical dismissals of nativism 
as a ‘catalogue of epistemological error, of essentialist mystifications, as masculinist 
appropriation of dissent, as no more than an anti-racist racism etc.’27   
 
Nativism is widely discussed and critiqued in literary studies where it is traced to the 
movement/ideology termed romanticism. Romanticism began from the period of the 
French Revolution (1789) and was a revolt against neoclassicism that was characterised 
by emotional restraint, order, logic and technical precision.28 Romanticism was marked 
by glorification of nature, idealisation of the past and celebration of the divinity of 
creation. It was an emotional movement.29 Therefore, those studying nativism from a 
literary angle, particularly those using post-colonial theories saw it as largely ‘romantic’ 
ideology marked by idealisation of the past through appeals to human emotions. Matthew 
Engelke described nativism and nationalism as ‘romanticism’s more dangerous and 
problematic cousins.’30  Those working within literary studies mainly discuss nativism in 
relation to the shifting focus of the themes of novels and poems from realism, nativism, 
nationalism to post-realism, post-nativism and post-nationalism.31 For instance, Kwame 
Anthony Appiah defined nativism as ‘the claim that true African independence requires a 
literature of one’s own’ and as ‘the rhetoric of ancestral purity.’ 32 Appiah made the 
following broad criticism of nativism in general: 
 
Railing against the cultural hegemony of the West, the nativists are of its party 
without knowing it. Indeed the very arguments, the rhetoric of defiance, that our 
nationalist muster are…canonical, time tested…. In their ideological inscription, 
the cultural nationalists remain in a position of counteridentification…which is to 
continue to participate in an institutional configuration-to be subjected to cultural 
identities they ostensibly decry…Time and time again, cultural nationalism has 
followed the route of alternate genealogizing. We end up always in the same 
place; the achievement is to have invented a different past for it.33   
 
As noted by Parry such a critique is weak in the sense that ‘the effect of this argument is 
to homogenise the varieties of nationalisms and to deny both originality and effectivity to 
its reverse-discourse.’34 The reality is that  when nativism is defined within the post-
                                                 
27 Benita Parry, ‘Resistance Theory/Theorizing Resistance of Two Cheers for Nativism,’ in Francis Barker, 
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colonial context, it becomes even more complex. It tends to soak up all the post-colonial 
theoretical conundrums as well as the psychological, cultural and political complexities 
associated with what Achille Mbembe described as the ‘postcolony.’35 A number of 
definitions of nativism have cropped up as scholars try to understand resurgent 
nationalisms in post-colonial Africa. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and H. Tiffin have 
defined of nativism as: 
 
A term for the desire to return to indigenous practices and cultural forms as they 
existed in pre-colonial society. The term is most frequently encountered to refer to 
the rhetoric of decolonisation which argues that colonialism needs to be replaced 
by recovery and promotion of pre-colonial, indigenous ways.36
 
This definition is slightly different from Appiah’s conception of nativism in Africa as 
presenting itself as an opposition between ‘universalism’ and ‘particularism,’ translating 
into ‘two real players in this game: us, inside; them, outside.’37  This ‘topology’ of 
‘inside and outside’ translates into ‘indigene and alien.’ The advocates of nativism in 
Africa and other parts of the world are currently mobilising supporters behind nationalist 
rhetoric to spread venom against the aliens including the white settlers whose parents 
came to Africa long ago carried by the successive waves of mercantilism, imperialism 
and colonialism.  
 
In South African nativism is taking the form of xenophobia crystallising around 
competition for jobs, houses and transport between South Africans and immigrants from 
other countries.38  In all intents and purposes, xenophobia is a key component and most 
dangerous part of nativism. It takes the form of hatred by the native-born people of 
immigrants. Francis B. Nyamnjoh in a recent study on citizenship and xenophobia in 
contemporary Southern Africa  noted that xenophobia as a form of intense dislike, hatred 
or fear of others perceived to be strangers has intensified with globalisation.39 
Xenophobia is just one aspect of nativism as an ideology and social movement. 
 
Nativism remain misunderstood because very few scholars want to understand its 
meaning and essence. As noted by Benita Parry nativism is approached ‘with a 
disciplining theoretical whip in hand’ leading to very simplistic dismissals of the 
phenomenon as a false philosophy.40 What exists are robust dismissals of nativism  
coming from a group of scholars one can term ‘post-modern cosmopolitanists’ working 
                                                 
35 Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 2001). 
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within the broader framework of promoting cosmopolitanism across the world.41 Achille 
Mbembe falls within this scholarship which is at pains to contest essentialist notions of 
identity and to dismiss the emancipatory value of nationalism (s). They argue in the same 
lines as Eric Hobsbawm who described nationalisms of the late twentieth century as 
essentially negative and as mere ‘reactions of weakness and fear’ and attempts to erect 
barricades to keep at bay the forces of the modern world.’42 To post-modern 
cosmopolitanists, nationalism and nativism are provoked by anxieties of modernity—a 
response with little positive value of its own.43  It is no wonder then that Achille Mbembe 
defines nativism within a universal narrative. He understands it in cultural terms as: 
 
Nativism is a discourse of rehabilitation. It is a defence of the humanity of 
Africans that is almost always accompanied by the claim that their race, 
traditions, and customs confer to them a peculiar self irreducible to that of any 
other human group.44
 
Defined this way, then nativism is nothing more than simple essentialism and a false 
comfort in a global age. Mbembe characterises nativism as ‘the burden of the 
metaphysics of difference’ and he links it directly to what he terms ‘historicism’ feeding 
into Afro-radicalism (a baggage of instrumentalism and political opportunism).45 
According to Mbembe, nativism emerged from an emphasis on the ‘native condition’ 
which in the long run ‘promoted the idea of a unique African identity founded on 
membership of the black race.’46 The roots of nativism according to Mbembe are to be 
sought in three historical events of slavery, colonisation and apartheid that have been 
apportioned canonical meanings by nationalist inspired scholars.  Three meanings were 
therefore attributed to slavery, colonialism and apartheid. One was pitched at individual 
level focussing specifically on the issue of individual subjectivities with slavery, 
colonialism and apartheid resulting in alienation of the African from the original Self, 
leading to ‘a loss of familiarity with self’ and culminating in estrangement of Africans 
from their identity, relegating Africans ‘to a lifeless form’ of objecthood.47  The second 
meaning is related to property ownership in Africa. Slavery, colonialism and apartheid 
combined to dispossess Africans of their property and this issue of dispossession is cited 
as a key component making African history and African experience unique in the world. 
The third meaning is associated with human degradation with slavery, colonisation and 
apartheid standing accused of plunging ‘the African subject not only into humiliation, 
debasement and nameless suffering but also into a zone of nonbeing and social death 
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characterised by the denial of dignity, heavy damage and the torment of exile.’48 Finally, 
Mbembe makes the point that the above described meanings attributed to slavery, 
colonialism and apartheid ‘serve as a unifying center for Africans’ desire to know 
themselves, to recapture their destiny (sovereignty), and to belong to themselves in the 
world (autonomy).’49  
 
If one follows closely the arguments of post-modern cosmopolitanists, Africa and 
Africans seem to be closed in a dead end revolving around fatalistic politics of 
victimhood. Victimhood becomes a signifier of African identity and African solidarity. 
Nationalist inspired Africanists are said to be peddling an Afro-radical ideology that is 
reliant on a troika of rhetorical rituals centred on refutation of Western definitions of 
Africa; denunciation of what the West had done and continue to do in Africa; and frantic 
efforts to provide ostensible proofs disqualifying the West’s fictional representations of 
Africa and refuting its claim to have a monopoly on the expression of the human in 
general and that way opening up a space in which Africans can finally narrate their own 
fables without imitation of the West.50 According to Mbembe this is ‘a distinctively 
nativist understanding of history—one of history as sorcery.’51
 
Mbembe’s analysis of nativism exposes some tautologies and redundancies in African 
nationalism crystallising around  the constant refrain of ‘victimhood’  that goes like this: 
Africans have been enslaved, colonised and oppressed by the West. African resources 
had been looted by the West since the time of mercantilism. Europe underdeveloped 
Africa.52 African development is being deliberately thwarted by Europeans and 
Americans. African are currently suffering from neo-liberal imperialism and cultural 
imperialism. African experiences and realities are simply rendered as a catalogue of 
deprivations, denials, oppression, and exploitation proceeding directly from long history 
of slavery, imperialism, colonialism and apartheid. Capturing this tautology,  Mbembe 
elaborates his definition of nativism in this way: 
 
Well, I define ‘nativism’ as one of the culturalist responses Africans have 
given to the fact of denial of their humanity. It is a response which, while 
arguing that ‘Africans are human beings like any other,’ nevertheless 
emphasises the difference and uniqueness of their traditions or what they call 
their culture.53
 
Mbembe saw the emergence of contemporary nativism as associated with ‘some kind of 
political disorder and cultural dislocation.’54  In response to the formation of the Native 
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Club, Mbembe wrote that ‘a dozen years after apartheid ended, a dangerous  mix of 
populism, nativism and millenarian thinking is inviting South Africans to commit 
political suicide’ and he directly linked nativism to some form of African fatalism which 
he termed ‘Nongqawuse Syndrome.’  Mbembe defines the ‘Nongqawuse Syndrome’ as a 
reference to a ‘populist rhetoric and a millenarian form of politics which advocates, uses 
and legitimises self-destruction, or national suicide, as a means of salvation.’55 The 
‘Nongqawuse Syndrome’ is said to manifest itself in this way: 
 
First must emerge a false prophet--generally a person of very humble origins. 
Backed by a level of mass hysteria, the prophet claims that a great resurrection is 
about to take place. He justifies himself in the name of his ‘ancestors,’ his 
‘tradition’ or his culture.’56  
 
To Mbembe, nativism in South Africa is nothing but a dangerous coalescence populism, 
and millenarianism heralding national political suicide.57  Mbembe lamented how South 
Africa, not long ago, a ray of hope for a truly non-racial, modern and cosmopolitan  
society, was veering into nativism. This is how he put it: 
 
Years of apartheid violence and, more recently, the utter degradation of urban 
life has had devastating consequences on the culture of civility. Poverty, crime 
and disease, hunger and pestilence have weakened state and social institutions 
and are threatening to unravel the content of civic and ethical life. 
 
Even more dangerous is the shift from non-racialism to nativism. To the 
continuing denial of white privilege, many blacks now respond with an 
exacerbated sense of victimization. In the name of the ‘right to self-
definition,’ they are paradoxically re-creating the mental ghetto of white rule. 
The recent founding of the Native Club is but one example of the nativist 
renewal engulfing the country.58  
 
While Mbembe clearly identifies the causes of revival of nativism in South Africa as 
rooted in concrete socio-economic and political issues associated with the transition from 
apartheid to democracy, he still adopts a dismissive approach to the purpose and essence 
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of nativism. He rightly state that white nativism has always been about racial supremacy 
and black nativism has always been a product of dispossession. He surprisingly proceeds 
to state that nativism as a cultural and political protest has as its main task the creation of  
a common language of grievance as though grievances were not there already in South 
Africa and other post-colonial societies. He argues that  nativism is never attached to any 
concrete social or political programme of reform. He is convinced that nativism ‘can 
never be a progressive force.’59    
 
Mbembe’s constant attempt to dismiss resurgent ideologies like nativism has earned him 
severe criticism by those scholars still working within anti-colonial and nationalist 
paradigm. Mbembe is sometimes seen as an apologist of slavery, colonialism and 
apartheid through advocating that African people must forget these oppressive realities in 
order for them to move out of the ghetto to embrace cosmopolitanism and globalisation. 
He seems to be embracing neo-liberal cosmopolitan agenda that is running roughshod 
over realities of neo-colonialism in Africa.60 Mbembe falls into the trap of supporting 
‘Euro-nativism’ through being very negative of African ideologies of liberation.61 
Mbembe’s critique of nativism ends up being fully ahistorical, marked by refusal to 
seriously engage with the socio-political and economic realities that promoted and 
continue to promote nativist narratives in Africa. Mbembe ignores the fact that African 
identities were forged within the broader terrain shaped by struggles against slavery, 
imperialism and apartheid.  
  
There is no doubt whatsoever that nativism in post-settler societies is rooted in the 
intractable issues related to what the Left leaning scholars term the ‘national question’ 
and cannot just be dismissed as ‘fake philosophies,’ dogmas and doctrines that are 
constructed and reconstructed by neo-nationalists and neo-Marxists.  The issue of the 
national question cannot be masked  and veiled under formalities of liberal individualism. 
Defined broadly, the national question is an embodiment of land restitution, 
indigenisation of the economy, equitable re-distribution of the national cake, creation of a 
native or indigenous bourgeoisie, normalisation of the native-settler binaries, fulfilment 
of economic nationalism and the building of an independent state where black native 
intellectuals feel in control of the public discourse and the pulse of the nation.62 Writing 
in response to Mbembe’s dismissal of nativism, Sean Jacobs and Elke Zuern based in the 
United State of America argued that: 
 
How do we avoid the language of Afro-pessimism that plays into many Western 
misconceptions of Africa from the time of colonial rule and slavery? We need to 
be explicit in addressing the politics that creates the challenges we face, as well as 
the local responses to them. This politics does not have to do with putative 
wellsprings of nihilism in the African soul. It revolves around the incredible 
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challenges of addressing the gross human-rights violations of apartheid, of 
offering economic upliftment to a poor majority, of addressing pressing material 
needs, of providing healthcare, including access to life-saving  anti-retrovirals, 
and establishing the institutional foundations for a democratic state and ruling 
party.63  
 
In a clear critique of the broader cosmopolitanism discourse, Don Robotham  noted that 
the tendency to see little or no merit in national identities and nationalism is not only an 
obstacle to understanding Third World nationalism, ‘it also prevents an appreciation of 
the fundamental basis for nationalism in so-called developed countries.’64 Nativism is not 
only about populism, millenarianism and essentialism, it has very deep foundations in 
objective economic, political, social and cultural processes. There is need to grapple with 
contemporary social forces that produce nativism rather than being carried away by 
pontifications of the so-called ‘hyper-globalisers’ like Paul Gilroy and his ideas of 
‘strategic universalism’ and the notion of ‘post-anthropological.’65
 
South Africa just like other contemporary African states has not escaped from problem of 
incomplete decolonisation with its attendant issue of unsatisfactorily resolved national 
question. This is reflected in the continued South African search for common identity 
crafted around the ‘rainbow’ imagery.66 Abebe Zegeye noted that ‘South Africa still 
suffers, as do many other African societies, from the legacy of an identity-assigning 
colonialism and racialism imposed by successive minority governments. Colonialism and 
racialism were powerful factors in forming the identities of Africans.’67 This legacy is 
still making it hard for South Africa to achieve in concrete terms a ‘rainbow nation’ 
characterised by unity in diversity, tolerance of difference, equality, accommodation and 
common citizenship. One of the essential and common challenges in heterogeneous 
societies like South Africa is the constant potential for sub-groups based on ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic, racial, religious, regional, class or caste identities to feel excluded.68  
 
Don Robotham is taking a materialist understanding of the roots of nativism. He wrote 
that: 
When these hundreds of years of common history include merciless cruelties, 
denigrations,  and exploitation by the same oppressor, a particularly fierce 
nationalism is often the result. This collective sentiment simmers over centuries 
and then may burst forth with fanatical ferocity. While at the abstract level one 
can extract the universally human from the particular experience of local groups, 
all people make history in the concrete. It is this actually concrete common 
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historical experience that generates distinctive identities and necessarily find 
expression in national movements dedicated to that specific cause.69  
 
A closer look at nativism reveals Gayatri Spivak’s concept of ‘strategic essentialism’ at 
play as opposed to Paul Gilroy’s ‘strategic universalism.’70 Spivak has recently defended 
strategic essentialism of identities in post-colonial societies including signification of 
indigenous (native) cultures in resistance to the onslaught of global cultures that threaten 
to negate cultural difference or consign it to an apolitical and exotic discourse of cultural 
diversity. Spivak noted that there are indeed times when it becomes advantageous for 
members of oppressed groups to essentialise themselves for strategic purposes. One only 
needs to be vigilant and very clear as to the temporality/provisionality of such a stance.71 
Benita Parry has mounted a positive defence of nativism in her theorisation of resistance, 
giving two cheers to nativism. In defence of nativism, Parry wrote that: 
  
When we consider the narratives of decolonisation, we encounter rhetorics in 
which ‘nativism’ in one form or another is evident. Instead of disciplining these, 
theoretical whip in hand, as a catalogue of epistemological error, of essentialist 
mystifications, as a masculinist appropriation of dissent, as no more than an anti-
racist racism, etc., I want  to consider what is to be gained by an unsententious 
interrogation of such articulations which, if often driven by negative passion, 
cannot be reduced to mere inveighing against iniquities or a repetition of the 
canonical terms of imperialism’s framework.72
 
Parry introduced the concept of understanding nativism as a reverse-discourse with its 
own agency and status. A reverse-discourse uses the same categories and the same 
vocabulary used by dominant discourse to pothole, subvert, undermine and decentre the 
same dominant discourse.73 Nativism though currently viewed as a thing of a few black 
intellectuals in South Africa, it is clear that it is ranged against the remnants of settler 
colonialism and apartheid represented by the white dominated academy, the farm owned 
by white people, public discourse dominated by white neo-liberal scholars, as well as the 
mine and industry still owned by whites. Hence the relevance of Amilcar Cabral 
argument that as long as the reality of colonial exploitation, oppression and domination 
hover clearly over the heads of Africans then they are bound to remain in perpetual 
struggle.74 Recent history including developments in Latin America is showing that such 
struggles sometimes degenerate into nativism in many parts of the world. At another 
                                                 
69 Don Robotham, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Planetary Humanism,’ p. 567. See also Don Robotham’s critique 
of Paul Gilroy and post-modern cosmopolitanists in general, Culture, Society, Economy: Globalization and 
Its Alternatives, (Sage Publishers, London, 2005) 
70 Gayatri Spivak, The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues, (Routledge, London, 1990)  
71 William Kelly, ‘Postcolonial Perspective on Intercultural Relations: A Japan-U. S. Example,’ in The 
Edge: The E-Journal of Intercultural Relations, Volume 2, Number 1, (Winter 1999). 
72 Benita Parry, ‘Resistance Theory/Theorising Resistance or Two Cheers for Nativism,’ in Francis Barker, 
Peter Hulme and Magaret Iversen (eds.), Colonial Discourse/Postcolonial Theory, (University of 
Manchester Press, Manchester, 1994), p. 176.  
73 Ibid. 
74 Amilcar Cabral, Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings, (Heinemann, London, 1980).  
 20
level, globalisation and cosmopolitanism processes also contribute to the emergence of 
nativism as observed by Garth le Pere and Kato Lambrechts:  
 
Globalisation and localisation have also, in many instances, unfolded in tandem 
and locality has survived alongside globality. Human affiliations and loyalties are 
still heavily influenced by a person’s particular location in the ‘global village,’ 
whether based on place, age, nationality, community, and so on.75
 
Nativism must be understood as located in the confluence of what M. Featherstone 
defined as ‘a global cultural ecumene (a region of persistent culture interaction and 
transformation); a medium of interaction and interpenetration between universalism and 
particularism.’76 Globalisation has always generated tendencies of homogenisation and 
de-territorialisation, while at the same time provoking opposite forces of fragmentation 
and even re-nationalisation.77   
 
Such theorists of colonialism as Albert Memmi and Octave Mannoni in their seminal 
books, The Coloniser and the Colonised (1957) and Prospero and Caliban: The 
Psychology of Colonisation (1950) respectively began to deal with the issue of nativism 
long ago before the fall of the colonial empire. For instance, Memmi wrote that: 
 
We then witness a reversal of terms. Assimilation being abandoned, the 
colonised’s liberation must be carried out through a recovery of the self and of 
autonomous dignity. Attempts at imitating the coloniser required self-denial; the 
coloniser’s rejection is the indispensable prelude to self-recovery.78
 
The anti-colonial struggle in Africa had always had a cultural component that fed and 
sustained the spirit of nativism particularly the desire by the formerly colonised people to 
wish to destroy anything built by the coloniser. While in reality African nationalist 
leaders were happy to takeover from where the white colonialists left in terms of 
governance structures and economy, there was also a strong populist spirit that 
emphasised that ‘everything that belongs to the colonisers is not appropriate for the 
colonised’ creating the need for establishment of an ‘African interpretation’ of things 
well described by Achille Mbembe in the following terms: 
 
The emphasis is on establishing an ‘African interpretation’ of things, on creating 
one’s own schemata of self-mastery, of understanding oneself and the universe, of 
producing endogenous knowledge have all led to demands for an ‘Africa science,’ 
an ‘Africa democracy,’ and ‘African language.’79
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All this type of thinking is part of the African leaders and African intellectuals’ quest 
rebuild their nations, re-created African confidence destroyed by colonialism, rejuvenate 
African independence of thought, re-create African creativity as opposed to dependency 
and take the former colonised in the path down recovery of self respect and some 
semblance of authenticity.80  
 
It is no wonder then that the scholar-activists like Aime Cesaire and Leopold Sedar 
Senghor became the founding fathers of negritude, a clear nativist thought that tried to 
challenge colonial legitimating ideologies of the civilising mission, scientific racism, and 
technology-based paradigms of progress and development.81 Negritude has been exposed 
to serious criticism across the intellectual board but it remains a key tradition feeding into 
nativism. It was in reality part of the continuing search for African identity after long 
years of denigration under colonialism.82  Pal Ahluwalia noted that because negritude 
was widely criticised ‘for its reaffirmation of racial binaries, its critical role as a 
predecessor to decolonisation has received cursory attention.’83 I should add that 
negritude has arisen from death in the form of nativism in Africa. According to Leopold 
Sedar Senghor: 
 
In order to establish an effective revolution, our revolution, we had first to divest 
ourselves of our borrowed attire-that of assimilation-and assert our being, that is 
to say our negritude.84
 
Aime Cesaire had to elaborate that ‘we adopted the word negre as a term of defiance’ and 
as concrete cultivation of black consciousness and a counter to colonial rejection and 
enforced adoption of inferiority complex.85
 
Benita Parry has posed the challenging question: ‘Does revisiting the repositories of 
memory and cultural survivals in the cause of postcolonial refashioning have a fixed 
retrograde valency?’86 She posed this challenged as part of her endeavour to make ‘two 
cheers for nativism.’ Parry is critical of scholars who are according a totalising power to 
colonialist discourses while at the same time being dismissive of resistance discourses 
like nativism. As she put it: 
 
                                                 
80 This nativist drive included leading nationalists like Julius Nyerere, Ujamaaa: Essays on Socialism, 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1968) as well as leading African intellectuals like Kwasi Wiredu, 
Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective, (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 
1996); Paulin Hountondji (ed.), Endogenous Knowledge: Research Trails, (CODESRIA, Dakar, 1997), 
Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature, (James 
Currey, London, 1986) 
81  Aime Cesaire, Return to My Native Land, (Presence Africaine, 1968) and  Aime Cesaire, Discourse on 
Colonialism, (Presence Africaine, 1972). 
82 Pal Ahluwalia, ‘Negritude and Nativism’: In Search of Identity,’ in Africa Quarterly, volume 39, 
Number 2, (1999), pp. 22-43.   
83 Ibid. p. 23. 
84 Cited in Ahluwalia, ‘Negritude and Nativism,’ p. 25. 
85 Aime Cesaire, Discourse on Colonialism, (Presence Africaine, 1972), pp. 74-76. 
86 Parry, Resistance Theory/Theorising Resistance,’ p. 174. 
 22
Instead I would argue that the task is to address the empowering effects of 
constructing a coherent identity or of cherishing and defending against 
calumniation altered and mutable indigenous forms, which is not the same as the 
hopeless attempt to locate and revive pristine pre-colonial cultures.87  
 
Thus to Parry nativism must be evaluated as part the process of decolonisation as ‘as the 
agency of a transfigured social condition; hence holding in place that vision of the anti-
colonial struggle as a global emancipatory project and projecting the radical hope of an 
oppositional humanism.’88  Indeed over, the years the anti-colonial struggle and the 
decolonisation process developed into and evolved different revolutionary traditions  
ranging from Pan-Africanism to Black Consciousness Movement all permeated by the 
spirit of negritude that was nativistic in orientation. In support of nativism as a counter 
ideology to colonialism and racism, Chunua Achebe argued that: 
 
You have all heard of the African personality; of African democracy, of the 
African way to socialism, of negritude, and so on. They are all props we have 
fashioned at different times to help use get on our feet again. Once we are up we 
shall not need any of them any more. But for the moment it is in the nature of 
things that we may need to counter racism with what Jean-Paul Sartre has called 
an anti-racist racism, to announce not just that we are as good as the next man but 
that we are better.89  
 
 Just like Sylvia Washington BA argued that negritude had two variants, one historical 
focused on recognition of being black in a white world, and the other essentialist based 
on the ‘explosive notion of race,’ nativism too has a revolutionary variant that is 
emancipatory and pan-Africanist and a counter-revolutionary one that is rabidly racist 
and xenophobic.90
 
Recently, Eddy Maloka sought to understand the roots of nativism through delving 
deeper into revolutionary traditions that particularly shape South African identity. He 
identified pan-Africanism  that entailed a sense of unity among Africans on the continent 
and those in the Diaspora based on common historical experiences and common destiny. 
Pan-Africanism also entailed notions of ‘regeneration,’ ‘awakening’ or ‘renaissance’ of 
Africa as well the ‘dream’ of an Africa united in social, cultural, economic and political 
spheres, predicated on the overarching spirit of solidarity among people of African 
descent.91 With specific reference to the launch of the Native Club in South Africa, Eddy 
Maloka, saw it as taking the struggle further from the achievement of political power to 
the ‘realm of ideas’ as part of the continuum in the transformation of South Africa 
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society. This struggle pitched at the ‘realm of ideas’ relates directly to the role of 
intellectuals in such movements as nativism.92  
  
To radical African thinkers, colonialism is not yet a legacy and the decolonisation 
struggle must be taken to the realm of ideas, particularly grappling with epistemological 
dominance of post-Enlightenment western knowledge. Africa intellectuals or native 
intellectual should see to it that they take their rightful place as producers of knowledge 
usable and relevant to Africa. Referring to the Native Club in South Africa, Eddy 
Maloka, wrote that: 
 
Yet, the Native Club is simply a movement, or rather a network, of a section 
of our country’s intelligentsia which is ‘gatvol’ with the dominance that 
whites continue to enjoy in our knowledge production sector.93   
 
The leading post-colonial theorist Edward E. Said has grappled with the problematic 
issue of post-imperial and post-colonial identity in a way that is very useful towards a 
clear understanding of the politics of nativism in general. He started by posing the 
pertinent decolonisation question: How does a culture seeking to become independent of 
imperialism imagine its own past? He then proffered three answers: 
 
• The first is for the colonised to become a willing servant of imperialism, ‘a native 
informant.’ 
• The second is to be aware and accept the past without allowing it to prevent future 
developments. 
• The third is of striving to shed off colonial self in search for the essential and 
authentic pre-colonial self.94 
     
 
This analysis of the options available for colonised and the ex-colonised is very 
instructive to the debate on nativism and the three strands co-existed within the broader 
nationalist struggles for independence. South Africa had chosen the second option as 
state ideology. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was meant to 
acknowledge the past wrongs without necessarily dwelling in that past.95 But they were 
some who favoured the third option of ‘complete decolonisation’ and the creation of a 
black dominated African Republic of Azania not South Africa.  The third option is the 
nativist option. These issues will be clear as the discussion of nativism continues in the 
second part of this study. Suffice to say that nativism is currently expressed, articulated 
and orchestrated largely in Afro-radicalism terms that are seen as dangerous in a 
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cosmopolitan country like South Africa. It also manifests a continuation of African 
struggles for emancipation in the midst of poverty and underdevelopment. 
 
Antimonies of Black Political Thought  
A leading scholar on Asian cultural developments and cultural studies,  Kuan-Hsing 
Chen wrote that ‘right before and after national independence, nationalism has generated 
a by-product: nativism.’96 He added that: 
 
If, for centuries, colonialism has carried out a ‘civilising mission’ to remove 
‘backward’ local tradition, and replace it with more ‘advanced’ modernisation 
programs on every front, then the anti-colonial, national independence movement 
could no longer trust anything coming from the side of the colonial devils. A 
‘self-rediscovery movement’ was called upon to discover our uncontaminated self 
and authentic tradition, to replace the deeply invaded colonial 
imagination…colonialism works by the mechanism of identification, through 
aggression and establishing the coloniser as the figure of modernity, to bind 
coloniser and colonised together, then nativism works by an identification with 
‘the self.’97  
 
Indeed there is no doubt that nativism is a creature of African nationalism as well as a 
product of settler colonialism. An ANC Youth League document alluded to two streams 
of African nationalism dominant during the struggle for independence in South Africa. 
This is how the situation was put: 
 
There are two streams of African Nationalism. One centres around Marcus 
Garvey’s slogan, ‘Africa for Africans.’ It is based on the ‘quit Africa’ slogan and 
on the cry of ‘Hurl the white Man into the Sea!’ This brand of African 
Nationalism is extreme and ultra-revolutionary. There is another stream of 
African Nationalism which is moderate and which the [Africa National] Congress 
Youth League professes. We of the Youth League take account of the concrete 
situation in South Africa and realise that the different racial groups have come to 
stay, but we insist that a condition for inter-racial peace and progress is the 
abandonment of white domination and such a change in the basic structure of 
South African society that those relations which breed exploitation and human 
misery will disappear.  There our goal is the winning of national freedom for 
African people and the inauguration of a people’s free society where racial 
oppression and persecution will be outlawed.98  
 
The South African ideological situation is more complicated than this though it is 
possible to draw out some of the key contours of nationalist black thought. Two factors 
must be taken into account. South Africa has the oldest nationalist party that was formed 
on the 8th of January 1912, two years after the establishment of the Union of South 
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Africa. Secondly, South Africans fought the longest liberation struggle that stretched 
from 1912 to 1994. As a result of these two factors, there is no liberation struggle that 
was so cosmopolitan in ideological terms as the South African one. Over the years it 
soaked up too many strands of black liberation philosophies and traditions. At formation, 
what became later the ANC was initially called the South African Native National 
Congress (SANNC) and the founder Pixley Ka Izaka Seme outlined the purpose of the 
formation of this congress in this way: 
 
Chiefs of royal blood and gentlemen of our race, we have gathered here to 
consider and discuss a scheme which my colleagues and I have decided to place 
before you. We have discovered that in the land of their birth, Africans are treated 
as hewers of wood and drawers of water. The white people of this country have 
formed what is known as the Union of South Africa—a union in which we have 
no voice in the making of laws and no part in their administration. We have called 
you, therefore, to this conference, so that we can together devise ways and means 
of forming our national union for the purposes of creating national unity and 
defending our rights and privileges.99
 
The overarching purpose was to unite the black people as a race and across tribal and 
ethnic division into a national political formation to fight against white oppression and 
for black rights. What later became ANC was initially formed as a ‘native’ organisation 
standing for ‘native’ interests vis-à-vis white interests which were saved by the Union of 
South Africa. According to the Natives’ Land Act of  1913: 
 
Native shall mean any person, male or female, who is a member of an aboriginal 
race or tribe of Africa; and shall further include any company or other body of 




By defining and naming black people as ‘natives’ an identity was being created by 
colonialists based largely on race. The colonialists went on to acknowledge that natives 
are ‘an aboriginal race’ of Africa, indirectly accepting that as whites they were not 
‘natives’ of Africa. This white settler racism was to form a fertile ground for the 
emergence of an African form of nationalism that crystallised around the plight of 
‘natives.’ The ANC was no exception to this reality even though those writing the history 
of this movement after 1994 had to telescope events, creating an impression of the ANC 
as having a clear non-racial ideology from its formation to the end of the struggle against 
apartheid in 1994. A closer look at the long history of the ANC does not confirm the 
thesis that: 
 
From the founding of the African National Congress in 1910 until it came to 
power in 1994, the ANC leadership at its core remained committed to ‘a belief in 
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non-racial principles and …a future South African society characterised and 
enriched by the growing interdependence and co-operation of its various 
population groups within one economic and political order.’101   
 
The ANC like all African liberation movements had a general direction of its struggle but 
had no clear path of realising it. It had no clear ideological underpinning. Again like all 
African liberation movements it was often forced to react to the apartheid colonial state. 
The issue of ideology was never settled at any one time up until the negotiation time of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s that culminated in the transition from apartheid to 
democracy in 1994, whereby the ANC was forced to project more the non-racial strand as 
its public transcript for strategic and pragmatic purposes. The reality is that the ANC 
operated in a hegemonic fashion, consistently surviving by swallowing different strands 
and doses of African nationalist political thinking on liberation and soaking up different 
ideological strands of black struggles from within South Africa and from outside. At least 
Francis Meli was nearer to the reality when he wrote that Africanism ‘has always been a 
contradictory phenomenon’ within the ANC and that such luminaries of the anti-
apartheid struggle like Anton Lemede, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Goven Mbeki and 
many others learnt through the struggle and the exigencies of the struggle made them to 
realise the limits and exclusive tendencies of radical Africanism.102 As put by Meli, they 
‘grew away’ from exclusive black Africanist ideology.103
 
Issues of race and class always made the nationalist struggle complicated. If one adds the 
other issues of indigeneity, entitlements, culture and rights, everything becomes muddled 
to the extent that schisms, divergences, convergences, splits as well as alliances were 
determined by these issues. Four strands of thought can be identified within the broader 
liberation movements in South Africa and its intellectuals. The first strand is what Peter 
P. Ekeh described as the African bourgeois ideology of legitimation espoused by Western 
educated Africans.104 It involved two desires. The first was a quest for inclusion in 
colonial governance which later developed into the second aspect of trying to replace 
white colonial rulers. It was basically a moderate and elitist thought that sought 
citizenship rights through miming imperial discourses and was not opposed to the 
perceived ideals and principles of Western institutions. It was predicated on the manifest 
acceptance of white liberal ideals and principles, accompanied by the insistence that 
African conformity with them indicated a level of achievement that ought to earn the new 
educated Africans the right to the leadership of their country.105  
 
                                                 
101 Loius A. Picard, The State of the State: Institutional Transformation, Capacity and Political Change in 
South Africa,  (University of Witwatersrand Press, Johannesburg, 2005), p. 93. See also Peter Wlashe, The 
Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa, A. D. Donker, Cape Town, 1987) and Sheridan Johns and R. 
Hunt Davis, Jr. (eds.), Mandela, Tambo and the African National Congress: The Struggle Against 
Apartheid, 1948-1990-A Documentary Survey, (Oxford University Press, New York, 1991). 
102 Francis Meli, A History of the ANC: South Africa Belongs to Us, (James Currey, London, 1998), pp. 
109-112.  
103 Ibid. 
104 Peter P. Ekeh, ‘Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement,’ pp. 91-112. 
105 Ibid. p. 101. 
 27
The second strand of thought was Ethiopianist in outlook focusing on a separate and 
more exclusive black liberation movement. Pan-Africanism that was spreading 
throughout Africa since the achievement of independence by Ghana in 1957 reinforced 
and solidified Ethiopianist thought and its claims of  ‘Africa for Africans’ and the 
establishment of  back republics across Africa. Pan-Africanism dovetailed with 
Garveyism and its slogan ‘Africa for Africans.’106 Nativism was in-built into this strand 
that sought black native liberation from white settler domination and that interpreted the 
whole struggle in race terms, including seeking recovery of African past, African culture 
and restoration of African dignity. The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) under the 
charismatic and radical leadership of Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe imbibed the key issues 
of Pan-Africanism while basing its identity on the value system of the 1949 ANC Youth 
Congress’ Africanist Programme of Action.107 African affirmation was viewed as a 
precondition to liberation in the context of colonial and apartheid racial oppression of 
Africans. The rise of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) under Steve Bantu 
Biko in Eastern Cape was part of African affirmation initiated by PAC. This connection 
is well put by Steven M. Davis who noted that: 
 
Africanism as a ideology…would not wither with the PAC. Its popularity as an 
alternative to multiracialism was undiminished and was to manifest itself in later 
years through intermittent revivals of the PAC and through the rise of black 
consciousness.108   
 
Back republicans were of the opinion that citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa 
should be rooted in African communal identities, values, and virtues. A true ‘Azanian’ 
was expected to be black African fully committed to the right of the African people to 
self-rule and reclaim all of their ancestral land.109
 
The third strand of political thought looked towards traditionalist ethnic-cultural 
leadership and espoused a form of ethnic nationalism that sought liberation of different 
ethnic groups as nations. The Inkatha Freedom Party under Chief Gatsha Mongosuthu 
Buthelezi was influenced by this strand of thought.110 The final strand of black thought 
took the form of Afro-Marxism with an emphasis on class struggles and economic 
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liberation.111 The South African Communist Party (SACP) took the lead on this strand of 
thought bringing together whites and blacks who were left leaning.  
 
These strands were all shaped by what Kuan-Hsing Chen termed ‘the decolonisation 
question’ where settler colonialism shaped even its supposed opposite (African 
nationalism):  
 
Shaped  by the immanent logic of colonialism, Third Word nationalism could not 
escape from reproducing racial and ethnic discrimination; a price to be paid by the 
coloniser as well as the colonised selves.112
 
At a broader level African nationalist ideologies were not completely disconnected from 
the broader global ideologies of liberalism, socialism, and republicanism. But as noted by  
C. R. D. Halisi, ‘at the core of black political thought there are two interrelated and 
recurring visions of liberation: one, the image of multiracial union; the other, black 
republican ideology.’113 However, to see the intellectual debates in multi-racial and non-
multi-racial binaries, ignores the third vision crystallising around what one can term 
indigenous conception of citizenship focused on native entitlements and black rights as 
opposed to those of white settlers whom radical Africanists considered as aliens if not 
enemies of black liberation. Halisi, however, raised an important point that has direct 
bearing on the formation of such phenomenon as the Native Club where he wrote that: 
 
Nascent questions of national identity (how the people are to be defined, who 
belongs to the political community, and what are the criteria of inclusion and 
exclusion) embedded in various schools of liberation thought profoundly 
influence black popular attitudes towards South Africa’s fledging democracy.114      
 
The central concerns of liberation in South Africa was intertwined with the key question 
of the relationship between capitalist industrialization and racial domination. The 
moderate nationalist black organisations that formed themselves around the ANC over 
the years, mobilised support across race and formed alliances across the racial divide.  
Those forces that formed themselves around the Pan-African Congress (PAC) interpreted 
the nationalist struggle in pan-African terms of mobilising black Africans and black 
South Africans to fight for a black republic of Azania. It was not the PAC alone that 
espoused the black republican tradition. The other organisations included  the Non-
European Unity Movement, the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), the South 
African Students Organisation and the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO). Those 
that espoused multiracial tradition included the ANC, the South African Indian Congress, 
the South African Coloured People’s Organisation, the Congress of Democrats and the 
South African Congress of Trade Unions.  The divisions in ideological terms were 
however not rigid and the currents of black republicanism were strong also within the 
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ANC and the multiracial ethos was also present within PAC. This complexity of South 
African politics was well captured by Robert Thornton when he wrote that: 
 
South African politics has constantly attempted to explicate and examine the 
grounds of its very being. This is a politics which has not been able to take for 
granted the nature or number of its primary actors. It is a politics that seeks not 
merely to distribute power, or to acquire and maintain power, but to define the 
nature of power itself. Many different political visions contend with one another 
in the political arena; even the limits and nature of the arena itself are questioned 
and tested.115
 
No wonder then that the BCM dug clear trenches within the broader liberation 
movement, ‘trenches for physical and psychological warfare.’116  The leader of the Black 
Consciousness Movement, Steve Bantu Biko, defined his issue of black consciousness as: 
  
…an attitude of mind and a way of life, the most positive call to emanate from the 
black world for a long time. Its essence is the realisation by the black man of the 
need to rally together with his brothers around the cause of their oppression—the 
blackness of their skin—and to operate as a group to rid themselves of shackles 
that bind them to perpetual servitude…Our culture, our history and indeed all 
aspects of the black man’s life have been battered nearly out of shape in the great 
collision between the indigenous values and the Anglo-Boer (Afrikaner) 
culture.117
 
Black Consciousness Movement was clearly nativist in its claims, fighting against 
culturally imposed black self-negation, self-alienation and the feeling of inferiority. 
Nobody doubts that colonialism led to what Ali A. Abdi termed ‘identity deformation’ 
that needed to be reconstituted if natives/blacks were to regain lost confidence.118 On the 
other hand, those organisations affiliated to the ANC began to soak up issues of 
constitutionalism driving more and more for a constitutional pluralist democracy based 
on common citizenship with mutual respect  for different cultural traditions.119
 
The ANC itself retained a strong pool of Africanists even after the defection of some to 
form the PAC in 1959. As a movement, the ANC became a bizarre mixture of liberals, 
traditionalists, Marxists, conservatives, radicals, Africanists, Black Consciousness 
activists, Africans, Coloureds, Indians and whites. Anton Lembede a leading Africanist 
within the ANC protested against the bambazonke (catch all) ideological disposition of 
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the ANC, arguing that the political movement must cease to run like an ideological 
omnibus ‘stopping at every station to pick up all sorts of passengers.’120 The operation of 
the ANC as an omnibus was both a strength and a weakness throughout its existence, 
making it the largest organisation but also plunging it into constant crises. For instance, at 
the Morogoro General Conference of 1969, the ANC decision to allow whites to join its 
Executive Council immediately provoked the development of a hard line Africanist 
radical faction opposed to white membership of the party.121  The Africanists were of the 
view that once the ANC was in power, black Africans as a group should be dominant in 
government and the economy. In 1975, ANC was hit by another crisis, with eight of its 
influential members attacking the decision of opening ANC ranks to whites. They also 
protested about the growing influence of the SACP within ANC.122  
 
By 1979, the ANC was joined by some large number of Black Consciousness group with 
its radical Africanists ideology. Thus within the ANC co-existed uneasily radical 
Africanists with moderate non-racialists.  At another level, internal struggles took class 
forms particularly in the 1990s, when the populist radical Left-leaning members felt 
marginalised by the moderate bourgeoisie Right within the ANC. Those who came to 
power in 1994 were described by radicals as the moderate bourgeoisie Right-wingers of 
the ANC.123  So within the ANC itself, a strong Africanist voice continually questioned 
the dominance of whites within the movement and continually pushed the ANC towards 
black nationalism and nativism. 
 
That nativism was going to be a problem in post-colonial African was pointed out long 
ago by Frantz Fanon when he state that: ‘From nationalism we have passed to ultra-
nationalism, to chauvinism, and finally to racism.’124 From as far back as 1961, Fanon 
had already noticed that there was ‘permanent seesaw between African unity, which 
fades quicker and quicker into the mists of oblivion, and a heartbreaking return to 
chauvinism in its most bitter and detestable form.’125 Thus the nativism that is 
symbolised by the formation of the Native Club in South Africa is taking the form of 
revivalist nationalist-cultural outlook even though currently is spearheaded by a few 
black intellectuals.    
 
The Immanent Logic of Settler Colonialism and the Settler-Native Question  
The settler-native question is a problem of citizenship, rights, and entitlements to such 
resources as land and to political positions in post-colonial Africa. The settler-native 
problem was deliberately created by settler colonialism, particularly through the shift 
from direct rule predicated on the civilizational project to indirect rule predicated on use 
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of pre-colonial African institutions to rule over Africans. Mahmood Mamdani noted that 
in contrast to the single legal universe of direct rule, indirect rule divided natives into 
separate groups and governed each through a different set of customary law.126   Settler 
colonialism in South Africa took the form of socio-political and economic domination of 
indigenous communities and the bifurcation of people under colonial rule into natives and 
non-natives. There were two bases on which the bifurcation was justified: race and 
civilisation. Mamdani argued that ‘as the litmus of a civilizational test, the law separated 
the minority of civilised  from the majority of those yet-to-be-civilized, incorporating the 
minority into a regime of rights while excluding the majority that same regime.’127
 
Settler colonialism was a more resilient form of colonialism represented by white settlers,  
making permanent homes within colonies and preparing themselves to resist both 
metropolitan pressures and African resistance. Ronald Weitzer noted that: 
 
The settlers’ characteristic intransigence makes the transformation of these 
states considerably  more difficult and complicated than the decolonisation of 
conventional colonies, where imperial powers disengaged with the broad 
support of local social forces.128  
 
Settler societies were founded by white migrant groups who then ‘assumed a super-
ordinate position vis-à-vis native inhabitants and build self-sustaining states,’ organised 
around  white settlers’ economic, social and political domination over the indigenous 
population.129 In the earlier settler colonies in America and Australia, the settler-native 
issue was solved through what Ronald Weitzer termed ‘final solutions on their native 
problems,’ involving outright elimination and forcible displacement to open the way for 
‘quasi-European societies’ to be established.130
 
The Dutch who first landed in the Cape in 1652 were the first settlers to come to South 
Africa. Francis B. Nyamnjoh noted that for purposes of economic, cultural and political 
hegemonies of the West vis-à-vis the rest, the early colonial whites managed to tame their 
differences and the early Dutch settlers actively encouraged immigration of whites from 
Europe and practically allowed them free access to territory.131 Immigration of black 
people was not allowed except ‘for slaves or labour zombies, and on terms defined 
exclusively by the interests of the settler whites.’132  
  
Settler colonies moulded themselves as ‘neo-Europes’ in Africa and a difficulty duality 
between the settler and the native ensured immediately the settler began to consider the 
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colonised territory as his/her permanent home. As noted by Weitzer, ‘this paramount 
interest shaped all social, economic, and political relations with the indigenous 
population.’133 The settler societies in Africa, faced a governance issue which they 
termed ‘the native problem’ which pre-occupied the minds of such colonial theorists as 
Lord Lugard, Cecil John Rhodes and Jan Smuts.  On 23 June 1817, Rhodes told the Cape 
Parliament that:  
 
I will lay down my own policy on this native question. Either you have to receive 
them on equal footing as citizens, or call them a subject race. Well, I have made 
up my mind that there must be pass laws and peace preservation acts and that we 
have got to treat natives where they are in a state of barbarism, in a different way 
to ourselves. We are to be Lords over them. These are my policies on native 
affairs…treat the native as a subject people as long as they continue in a state of 
barbarism and communal tenure, be Lords over them and let them be subject race 
and keep liquor from them.134
 
In a ground breaking book entitled Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the 
Legacy of Late Colonialism, Mahmood Mamdani grappled with the issue of how settlers 
ruled natives. Mamdani noted that the advent of settler colonialism entailed 
differentiating peoples in the colony. White settlers did not want to mingle with the black 
natives. In the settler colonial set up, the whites organised themselves into citizens 
inhabiting the city, enjoying full civil and political as well as  economic rights. The black 
indigenous people were ascribed the status of subjecthood and denied the enjoyment of 
political and civil rights. Their permanent abode was to be the rural reserves.135 This is 
how a minority white power was to rule over a black indigenous majority. This is how 
Mamdani put the issue of the nature of settler colonial governance: 
 
Direct rule was the form of urban civil power. It was about the exclusion of 
natives from civil freedoms guaranteed  to citizens in civil society. Indirect rule, 
however, signified a rural authority. It was about incorporating natives into a 
state-enforced customary order. Reformulated, direct rule and indirect rule are 
better understood as variants of despotism: the former centralised, the latter 
decentralised. As they learned from experience—of both the ongoing resistance of 
the colonised and of earlier and parallel colonial encounters—colonial powers 
generalised decentralised despotism as their principle answer to the native 
question.136
 
Under apartheid settler colonialism, the state was bifurcated with two systems of rule co-
existing under a single hegemonic colonial authority. Racism was at the centre of colonial 
governance.  Since the publication of his seminal book, Citizen and Subject, Mamdani 
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has preceded to grapple with the question of citizenship in post-colonial Africa, 
beginning with pertinent question of when does a settler become a native. One of his key 
responses to that question is that: 
 
The settler-native question is a political question. It is also a historical question. 
Settlers and natives belong together. You can not have one without the other, for 
it is the relationship between them that make one a settler and the other a native. 
To do away with one, you have to do away with the other.137  
               
According to Mamdani there is no single answer to the question of when does a settler 
become a native because it is dependent on whether one considers it from civic or ethnic 
angle. If one replies this question from the vantage point of civic notion of citizenship, 
the answer is very simple: it is merely a matter of time and is dependent on constitutional 
provisions of the country. However, when one considers this question from the notion of 
ethnic citizenship, the answer is that a settler will never be a native. According to 
Mamdani, so long as the distinction between the settler and native is written into the 
structure of the state, the settler can only become a citizen but never a native.138 This 
inflexibility is a product of the bifurcation of the colonial state into citizens and subjects 
that was readily inherited by the post-colonial state. The post-colonial leaders succeeds 
only in de-racializing the civic space, but retained the rigidities of the customary space 
and even reinforcing ethnicized despotism.139 For the settler to be a native, it means 
having a native authority (a chief), an ethnic group to belong to and a native homeland. 
Already the white Afrikaner population in South Africa is demanding that it be 
considered and recognised as natives, complete with a native homeland as well as a 
native authority.  This is not easy in a country like South Africa where the civic space 
was de-racialised and the customary/native space was not reformed of its rigidities 
imposed by settler colonialism.   
 
How white settlers ruled Africans/natives is at the core  of some of the post-colonial 
dilemmas of citizenship in Africa in general where the binaries and bifurcated identities 
of ‘native’ and ‘settler’ continue to shape politics in post-settler societies. Viewing the 
country as their permanent abode, white settlers typically monopolised the political 
system as their private preserve and the socio-economic order as the vehicle for their 
exclusive prosperity.140 At a practical level, this included primitive accumulation of 
wealthy tactics such as expropriation of the richest land, forcible displacement of natives 
from their original lands, wholesale claiming of prime natural resources  like minerals, 
introduction of open social segregation as well as enactment of exploitative practices to 
exploit native labour.141 The native-settler divide was concretely created through the 
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process of demarcation of land into reserves and homelands as abodes of natives and 
towns as natural abodes of white settlers where native entry was very restricted and 
closely monitored to ensure that those natives who entered did so for purposes providing 
cheap labour. 
            
The settler-native question was also a legal one in the sense that these distinctions were 
crafted into colonial law. Mamdani wrote that ‘it strikes me that none of us—neither 
nationalists or Marxists—historicised the political legacy of colonialism, of the colonial 
state as a legal/institutional complex that reproduced particular political identities.’142  
This is a relevant issue in that settler colonialism created and promoted the native identity 
and made sure that it endured into a colonial reality sustained mainly by race attitudes. It 
was also the settlers who made a clear distinction between race and ethnicity, making it 
clear that only natives belonged to ethnic groups, identifying themselves as belonging to 
a racial identity.143 It is imperative to summarise Mamdani’s concise analysis of colonial 
‘rooted ness’ of  the post-colonial citizenship-related conflicts: 
 
• How colonialists governed Africa forms the background of post-colonial 
citizenship problems in Africa involving former settlers, former natives and 
different ethnicities. 
• Colonialism bifurcated colonial population into citizens, subjects and numerous 
rigidified ethnic groups. 
• Colonial denial of citizenship to Africans (black subjects) set the stage for 
African nationalism to be a struggle for citizenship rights. 
• Colonialism was marked by deeply ingrained and deliberately promoted racism 
where race became a pre-condition for citizenship. 
• Colonialism is the mother of citizenship problems in Africa. 
• Colonialism ossified African ethnic identities and coded then in legal terms, 
affixing rigid boundaries. 
• African nationalism failed to transcend the ethnic boundaries created by 
colonialism, instead it developed on the lines of ethno-nationalism. 
• At independence, African nationalists concentrated on de-racialising the civic 
space while at the same time reinforcing decentralised despotism at the local 
level crafted around the African chief and customary law. 
• Indigeniety of the black people was raised by African nationalist a basic premise 
for the black native to take over leadership from the alien white. 
• Indigeniety was raised to a level of a minimum criteria for one to be accorded 
and enjoy citizenship rights in the country. 
• Nationalist victory raised the black community from a subject race to citizenship. 
  
Born out of colonialism, African nationalism became equally racist as the black 
bourgeoisie fought for power against white bourgeoisie. Nativism was deeply entrenched 
within the nationalist mobilisation strategies including that of land reclamation and 
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culture recovery from the past. In South Africa, following the launch of the Native Club, 
many white commentators and opposition leaders began to manifest fear and warn of the 
dangers of racial nationalism a la Zimbabwe where land has been violently taken from 
the white farmers and where the state has gone on to justify taking the land on nativist 
claims.144 Montlatjo Thetjeng, a member of parliament and the Democratic Alliance 
(DA) spokesman, defined the Native Club as ‘racist’ and as an example of racial 
nationalism at its zenith. He wrote that: 
 
But the Native Club isn’t about an antidote for liberalism. Philosophical 
considerations are nothing more than the veneer behind which a far more 
sinister and crude agenda lurks.  It is about race. What it is to be ‘black,’ who 
is a ‘native,’ who is a ‘settler,’ how black people should behave; how white 
people should act. It’s a racial club for people obsessed with race. Nothing 
more, nothing less.145
   
Doug Blackmur of the University of the Western Cape, took the debate on settler-native 
division to the level where he argued that the aboriginal people of South Africa are the 
Khoisan, and implied that both white and black were settlers.146 South Africa has a long 
history of the debate on nativity with the Afrikaners arguing that they are also native 
because they came into South Africa in 1652 and they occupied empty lands whose 
inhabitants have been devastated and depopulated by the Mfecane Wars.147  
 
The debates on the settler-native question are central as they indicate the complexities of 
the post-colonial and post-apartheid task of nation-building in South Africa and the 
underlying problems attendant to the process of construction of common citizenship. The 
founding fathers of democratic South Africa knew that South Africa had a muddled racial 
and ethnic identity that needed to be handled with care. Nelson Mandela spent his whole 
term in office trying very hard to create a common South African identity to the extent 
that some of his supporters thought he was bending too much to accommodate the whites 
who were reluctant to be part of a new South Africa. Mandela pursued a policy of 
reaching out to his former Afrikaner opponents in ways which sometimes dismayed or 
puzzled his black supporters. He visited former President P. W Botha and the widow of 
Dr Hendrik Verwood in a show of oneness.  His successor President Thabo Mbeki is well 
known for his famous ‘I am an African’ speech which was not just a show of African 
poetic mastery but a complex way of encapsulating the identity crisis that South Africans 
were supposed to transcend if not re-negotiate and re-define the conflictual past in 
positive terms for nation-building and state-consolidation purposes. A state and a people 
                                                 
144 Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘The  Nativist Revolution and Development Conundrums in Zimbabwe,’ in 
ACCORD Occasional Paper Series, Volume 1, Number 4, (2006), pp. 1-40.  
145 Motlatjo Thetjeng, ‘Native Club Racist,’ in Financial Mail, 26 May 2006. 
146 Doug Blackmur, ‘All Intellectuals,’ in Business Day, 13 June 2006  
147 The Mfecane refers to the 19th century political and violent developments that engulfed Nguni land 
involving raiding and migration of defeated chiefdoms. White literate observers emphasized the devastation 
caused by the Mfecane and used this argument to justify their land claims, particularly that they 
dispossessed non body of his or her land as they found empty and depopulated areas. See Julian Cobbing,  
‘The Mfecane As Alibi: Thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolompo,’ in Journal of African History, Volume 
29, (1988).   
 36
suffering from an identity crisis cannot articulate clear national, regional and international 
policies beyond being carried away by democracy and human rights discourse as the 
flavour of the moment at global level. Mbeki noted that the agenda of creating a single 
nation must start from the normalisation of difference.  The discourse of development, 
transformation and reconstruction could not be achieved in a society shot through with 
racial and ethnic differences bordering on hatred and revenge.  To try and normalise this 
difference, Mbeki resorted to a poetic definition of himself as an African. He said, ‘I am 
an African’ and: 
 
I owe my being to the hills and valleys, the mountains and the glades, the 
rivers, the deserts, the trees, the flowers, the seas and the ever-changing 
seasons that define the face of our native land…I owe my being to the Khoi 
and the San whose desolate souls haunt the great expanses of beautiful Cape-
they who fell victim to the most merciless genocide our native land has ever 
seen, they who were the first to lose their lives to defend our freedom and 
independence and they, as a people, perished in the result…I am the 
grandchild of the warrior men and women that Hintsha and Sekhukhune led, 
the patriots that Cetshwayo and Mphephu took to battle, the soldiers 
Moshoeshoe and Ngungunyane taught never to dishonour the cause of 
freedom. My mind and my knowledge of myself are formed by the victories 
that are the jewels in our African crown…I am born of a people who are 
heroes and heroines. I am born of a nation that would not tolerate oppression. 
I am born of a nation that would not allow that fear of death, torture, 
imprisonment, exile, or persecution should result in the perpetuation of 
injustice…I am born of the peoples of the continent of Africa. The pain of the 
violent conflict that the peoples of Liberia, Somalia, the Sudan, Burundi and 
Algeria experience is a pain I also bear. The dismal shame of poverty, 
suffering and human degradation of my continent is a blight that we share.148
 
In his attempt to normalise difference, Mbeki was clear in his mind that South Africa has 
many ethnic groups and races that all needed to feel part of the new South Africa and the 
rainbow nation. Thus instead of his speech being read as elegant poetry, Mbeki outlined 
the spectrum, contours and layers of particularistic and historical anchorages of South 
African identity and the complex cultural polyglossia and tapestry informing the search 
for a ‘rainbow’ national identity for South Africa.  South Africa is a home to various 
racial groups such as the Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking communities as well 
as Coloureds and Indians. To accommodate these racial groupings in the imagination of 
the South African nation as a ‘rainbow,’ Mbeki meticulously and poetically mobilised 
history to good use in nation-building: 
  
I am formed of the migrants who left Europe to find a new home on our native 
land. Whatever their own actions they remain still part of me. In my blood 
courses the blood of the Malay slaves who came from the East. Their proud 
dignity informs my bearing, their culture is part of my essence…I am the 
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grandchild who lays fresh flowers on the Boer graves at St. Helena and the 
Bahamas, who see in the mind’s eye and suffers the suffering of a simple 
peasant folk: death, concentration camps, destroyed homesteads, a dream in 
ruins…I come from those who were transported from China and India whose 
being resided in the fact, solely, that they were able to provide physical 
labour, who taught me that we could both be at home and be foreign, who 
taught me that human existence itself demanded that freedom was a necessary 
condition for that human existence. Being part of all these people and in the 
knowledge that none dare contest that assertion, I shall claim that I am an 
African.149
         
In this widely quoted speech Mbeki was making a compendium out of different 
components of South African national mosaic, identity tapestry, and poetically addressing 
the complex issue of identity in South Africa. Eventually, he made the crucial point that a 
South African ‘African’ was a product of complex historical processes. When he declared 
that  ‘I shall claim that I am an African,’ he made it clear that South African nationality 
and citizenship is based on ‘claims’ located deeply in history of the country rather than 
based on primordialist and racial claims. This strategy worked temporarily but currently 
fissures within the ANC are taking nativist directions threatening the whole ‘rainbow’ 
experiment. Even the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) has not helped matters 
much as it is lambasted of benefiting a few politically connected Africans who have 
joined the settlers on the high table.150
 
The colonially created non-native/settler  and native/black identities have proven to be a 
problem in post-settler and post-apartheid societies. Mamdani has identified  three of the 
‘postcolonial dilemmas.’ Firstly is the issue of the growing tendency for indigeneity to 
become the litmus test for rights under the post-colonial state. Secondly is the fact that 
African founding fathers built their states on colonial foundations, turning indigeneity 
into a test for justice and entitlement under the postcolonial state. Finally, is the issue of 
the growing tendency to identify a colonially constructed regime of customary law with 
Africa’s authentic tradition.151  The attempts by both conservative and radical nationalist 
founding fathers to transcend the problems of native and settler binaries and that of 
ethnicity through the simple strategy of de-racialising the civic space and without de-
ethnicising the customary sphere papered over crucial material inequalities and cleavages 
built during colonialism and apartheid. The problems of who is indigenous and who is 
not are feeding into different forms of nativism. In some former colonies, the question 
relates to which ethnic groups were indigenous and which ones were not. In South Africa, 
the question is still revolving around the settler and native binaries, with the settler being 
seen as alien and non-indigenous. Mamdani argues that immediately Africans began to 
engage with these questions within the postcolonial dispensation, ‘the colonial world’ is 
being turned ‘upside down’ without changing it. He elaborated that ‘as a result, the native 
                                                 
149 Ibid. 
150 Martin Paut, ‘South Africa’s Political Turmoil,’ in Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF), September 27, 2006 
in www.fpif.org
151 Mamdani, ‘Beyond Settler  and Native as Political Identities,’ p. 657. 
 38
sat on top of the political world designed by the settler.’152  It is this reproduction of the 
settler-native dialectic that promotes the feelings and nativist claims to land, to jobs, to 
rights, to production of knowledge and to almost everything by the former native ahead 
of the former settler. In countries like Rwanda and Ivory Coast, the version of nativism is 
taking ethnic terms, with those ethnic groups like the Hutu claiming indigeniety ahead of 
Tutsi, plunging the country into genocide.153
 
Africa has witnessed more and more violent ‘nativist revolutions’ since gaining 
independence in the 1960s. Beginning with the ‘social revolution’ of 1959 that recurred 
again in 1994 with more violence in Rwanda, to the expulsion of Asians by Idi Amin in 
Uganda in 1972 and Zanzibar Revolution in Zanzibar concerning Arabs of 1963, to the 
more recent  land struggles in Zimbabwe, subject races, former settlers as well as ethnic 
groups considered less native than others have been on the firing line. All these issues are 
intertwined with contemporary debates on citizenship and identity. For instance, in 
Uganda, those Asians who returned demanded that they be listed in the constitution as 
one of Uganda’s ethnic groups as a safeguard against any future harassment and as 
guarantee of the right to land too.154 At another level, former settlers have supported neo-
liberal politics predicated on civic conception of the nation and citizenship as their 
protection from the nativist inspired demands for justice and nativist claims to land.155  
 
All this was generated by colonial governance political structures that were predicated on 
the logic of dualism, of spatial, institutional, and territorial segregation and law.  Said 
Adejumbo correctly noted that the practice of colonial governance of fragmenting the 
local people into natives with different customary or tribal laws, constructed and 
fermented ethnic identities which were later to plague the state and polity in most post-
colonial African states156 It is imperative to add that the same colonial governance 
marked by bifurcation of people into citizens and subjects and natives and non-natives, is 
creating the current problems of nativism in post-settler and post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
The Rainbow Nation, Common Citizenship and the Challenge of Populism  
There is no country in Africa that became obsessed with neo-liberal ideologies as South 
Africa in the wake of the collapse of apartheid. The South African constitution is a neo-
liberal document par excellence. It was crafted during the time which was celebrated by 
Francis Fukuyama as; ‘The end of history and the last man,’ an epoch of triumphalism of 
neo-liberalism across the globe, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
implosion of communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe that inaugurated the end 
of the Cold War.157 For South Africa, democracy as a value and human rights as social 
imaginary, formed that basis of the post-apartheid political dispensation and became the 
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‘foundation myth’ for an ‘imagined’ new, civic, democratic and open society and a 
common citizenship under the ‘rainbow nation.’158 This must be understandable on the 
basis of the history of the country and the nature of the transition from apartheid to 
democracy as well as the racial and ethnic composition of the South Africa society. The 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) established in 1995 was scripted as the 
basis of laying to rest a racially divisive past and paving the way to a new future as a 
‘rainbow nation.’159    
 
The South African constitution also set out to be the basis for healing the divisions of the 
past and as a pre-requisite for the emergence of a single nation premised on equality and 
common citizenship.160 Quickly, the neo-liberal discourse on democracy and human 
rights pervaded the South Africa society at an alarming speed to the extent that Roger 
Southall noted that:  
 
There is no subject more out of bounds in South Africa’s contemporary political 
discourse than any suggestion that development may require constraints upon 
democracy. Democratic rights for the majority in South Africa have been so hard 
won that any hint that they have costs is distinctively unwelcome.161  
 
Commenting on the swiftness with which South Africans embraced neo-liberal 
democracy, Roger Southall further noted that: 
 
The ANC clings to its identity as the liberation movement which freed South 
Africa from the shackles of apartheid, the DA identifies itself as the embodiment 
of individual rights, and the New National Party found the burden of ridding itself 
of its apartheid past so great that it recently collapsed itself, unlamented, into the 
new ruling party. Everyone favours ‘freedom’ and academic commentators 
concur with the new global orthodoxy that the struggle for political and socio-
economic rights democratises development whilst also developing democracy.162   
 
Indeed the rank and file of South Africans became so obsessed with the idea of a new 
South Africa and the romantic idea of a ‘rainbow nation’ to the extent that there was 
overwhelming belief that democracy and human rights were naturally good values that 
were to be cherished by every one across race, ethnic, class and political spectrum. 
Democracy and human rights became associated with magical powers even to solve the 
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rich-poor divide that was deliberately institutionalised by apartheid regime. Little notice 
was taken of the fact that the celebrated neo-liberal democracy and its ‘rights-talk’ was in 
marriage with the exploitative capitalist economic system that was itself never supportive 
of the values of economic equality and achievement of social justice.  
 
Neo-liberal dispensation is ontologically concerned more about civil and political rights 
(first generation rights) and pays lip service to second and third generation rights that are 
of major concern in post-colonial Africa in general and post-apartheid South Africa in 
particular.163 Predicated on democratic and human rights values and norms, South 
Africans celebrated the democratic transition as the era of possibilities in every front and 
they vehemently rejected anything and anybody that warned them that the epoch of 
possibilities is also the era of deepening of inequalities covered under the veneer of the 
right to property ownership that was enthusiastically embrace by those who benefited 
from apartheid primitive accumulation policies mediated by race. In post-colonial Africa, 
the Bills of Rights that were enshrined into every independence constitution mainly 
benefited the ‘Haves’ that used it to justify the continued unequal ownership of land and 
other immovable properties like mines that they illegally took from the indigenous black 
people. There is no one who can deny the fact that in many post-colonial societies, 
particularly former settler colonies it is the settler that still owns the means of production. 
The mine, the farm, and the factory still remains a symbol of the victory of the settler 
over the native. This is not meant to ignore the advances made by some few Africans 
who now own these immovable properties in post-colonial Africa.  
 
One area that suffered in this era of democratic possibilities was the silence on the crucial 
issue of identity that is always at the centre of nation-building in post-colonial Africa. 
There was an assumption that because of the transition from apartheid to democracy, both 
natives and settlers would overnight metamorphose into a common citizenship. Nahla 
Valji of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation noted the TRC ‘was 
ironically silent on the issue of race—ironic given that it was functioning in the context 
of a country whose entire political and economic system was premised on the 
organisational principle of race.’164Critiquing the TRC as a safe foundation of new South 
Africa, Mahmood stated that: 
 
…the violence of apartheid was aimed less at individuals than at entire 
communities, and entire population groups. And this violence was not just 
political. It was not just about defending power by denying people rights. The 
point of torture, terror, death, was even more far-reaching: its aim was to 
dispossess people of means of livelihood…[The TRC model] obscured the 
colonial nature of the South African context: the link between conquest and 
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dispossession, between racialised power and racialised privilege. In a word, it 
obscured the link between perpetrator and beneficiary.165  
 
Apartheid was a brand of colonialism ranking together with indirect rule and association 
colonial ideologies of governance. At another level it was a form of internal colonialism. 
These dimensions of apartheid needed to be taken into account before people could buy 
into romantic and mistaken perception that because of the fall of apartheid then: ‘We are 
all South Africans, equal before the law. There are no longer blacks or whites.’166 The 
nation-builders thought that through education a democratic citizen was going to emerge 
in South Africa that was truly de-tribalised, de-racialised and de-ethnicised.167 The slogan 
that carried the day was that of non-racialism feeding into the romantic idea of an 
accommodative ‘rainbow nation.’ Below this euphoria of equality and common 
citizenship, lay dangerous forces that translated to the sad reality whereby: 
 
When convenient to them, members of both groups were quick to abandon the 
idea of a South African identity and adopt an exclusive racial identity.  The blacks 
argued that, while they accepted the principles of non-discrimination and merit, 
history and context demanded the retention of a racial criterion to prevent the 
perpetuation of white domination of top positions in the private and public 
sectors….Likewise, the whites adopted a group identity when minority rights 
were at issue. They argued that without minority rights, majority rule would lead 
to black domination.168  
 
As rightly noted by Maphai, the South African transition was complex involving a double 
and simultaneous move: ‘a shift from minority to majority rule, and a shift from an 
exclusive to an inclusive political system.’169 There was, however, a third move, 
involving dismantling the idea of ‘South African exceptionalism’ at the regional and 
continental level. Mahmood Mamdani clearly defined the problem of ‘South African 
exceptionalism’ as based on the belief that ‘South African experience is so totally and 
irrevocably shaped by the initiative of the settler, that South Africa is no longer, in any 
meaningful sense, a part of Africa, native Africa.’170 President Mbeki’s toying with 
African Renaissance; the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) as well as 
his active role in the African Union (AU) activities are all efforts meant to destroy the 
apartheid-created problem of ‘South African exceptionalism.’ On South African 
exceptionalism, Paul Tiyambe Zeleza writes that: 
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But the myth of South African exceptionalism must be resisted; it is a conceit 
fuelled by the fantasies of racist and apartheid South Africa that is was an 
extension of ‘Western Civilization’ on the ‘Dark Continent,’ and encouraged by 
European imperialists who saw it as a European outpost in need of their material, 
moral and political support and protection.171  
 
President Thabo Mbeki seems to be succeeding in Africanising South Africa at the level 
of its external relations level. But at home, the policy of reconciliation has constituted 
itself as a bulwark to radical changes. Reconciliation has become a legitimation of 
apartheid economic status quo. Writing on the meaning of reconciliation in Southern 
Africa, Ibbo Mandaza stated that it is in reality ‘the mourn of the weak, even when 
pronounced from positions of apparent moral and political superiority over oppressors 
and exploiters of yesterday.’172 He added that ‘The reconciliation exercise, therefore, 
serves largely a political function, facilitating the necessary compromise between the 
rulers of yesterday and the inheritors of state power, within the context of incomplete 
decolonisation.’173 Indeed in South Africa, the very rhetoric of reconciliation is 
constantly invoked to consolidate white privileges against all other initiatives that seek 
redistributive justice. The liberation struggle in South Africa ended up reduced to a 
simple anti-racism crusade to the extent that one liberation fighter lamented that he 
fought for freedom all his life but what he finally got was democracy.174  
 
‘South African exceptionalism’ defined in the mould of the settler determining and 
shaping public discourse as well as the destiny of the country is generating intense 
struggles with the black native seeking to be on the driving seat and to shape the public 
discourse in this largely African dominated Southern African nation.  One of apartheid’s 
enduring legacies was the distortion of South African identity fragmenting Africans into 
rigidified and geographically ring fenced homelands while at the same time codifying 
race as a pre-condition to access to citizenship. Instead of promoting a single citizenship, 
apartheid South Africa became a home to dozens of de-franchised African ethnic groups 
and other racialised groups of coloureds and Indians, all subsisting under the Afrikaner 
volk democracy mediated through and through by legislated racism known as separate 
development (apartheid). This created a serious identity crisis that even the ‘Madiba 
magic,’ ubuntu philosophy, and President Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance and pan-
Africanist politics could not solve until now.  
 
What need to be clearly noted is that twelve years of limited democracy punctuated by 
unimpressive wealth redistribution and the slow pace of transformation has provoked a 
growing level of restlessness among the black natives who since the settlement of the 
Dutch in the Cape in 1652 have seen their land being taken and have suffered multi-level 
dispossession and impoverishment.  The immediate post-1994 independence euphoria 
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and its expectation crisis is breeding not only despair but also agitation. High 
unemployment, high crime incidence, crisis of delivery of services, lack of affordable 
accommodation for the poor and many other unfulfilled expectations have become a 
fertile ground for re-thinking the direction of transformation, particularly the identity of 
who is continuing to benefit from it at the expense of who. Clearly the former white 
settler and a few black middle classes are benefiting at the expense of the majority poor 
black Africans. Inequality has deepened; poverty and HIV/AIDS pandemic have reached 
genocidal levels. As noted by Achille Mbembe: 
 
This is the context in which a class-oriented millenarianism and nativist 
revivalism are fuelling mass disillusion, if not outright discontent. The discontent 
is spearheaded by trade unions, the ANC Youth League and the South African 
Communist Party (SACP).175
  
Mbembe forgot to add the role of the black intelligentsia which is also agitated against 
what it defines as the dominance of neo-liberalism. Mbembe also fails to recognise the 
radical Africanism in President Thabo Mbeki that co-exist uneasily with his celebrated 
cosmopolitanism. This is how Mbembe put it: 
 
Although of a secular nature, this new millenarianism and nativist revivalism is 
using the eschatological language of the ‘revolution second coming’ in order to 
paint as the epitome of the Antichrist one of the most worldly, cosmopolitan and 
urbane political leaders modern Africa has ever known. Even though the 
followers of the maprofeti do not believe in the morality of the Christian church—
especially in matters of adultery—they are threatening President Thabo Mbeki 
with God’s wrath. They want to exact vengeance, to humiliate him and to punish 
him for his alleged political sins—a neo-liberal, aloof, secretive and paranoid 
intellectual who is bent on centralising power and on driving South Africa 
towards a Zimbabwe-style dictatorship.176  
 
But instead of defining the current development in South Africa and within the ANC in 
simple terms of the emergence of ‘prophets, healers and swindlers,’ and instead of being 
sarcastic about the revival and resurgence of black populist discourses, reducing these to 
maprofeti, African belief in witchcraft, anti-Christianity and millenarianism, we need to 
engage and historicise these as rational political developments with deep roots in the anti-
apartheid struggle dating back to the formation of ANC in 1912. What is at play here is 
far from ‘stirring the darkest brew of South African culture’ unless Mbembe associates 
the subaltern struggles with barbarity rather than a different imagination of the nation, 
liberation and citizenship.177
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Populist black republicanism with its radical dose of Africanism bordering on revival of 
African consciousness and building of a black republic of South Africa is deep rooted in 
the history of the ANC and in the competing imaginations and conceptions of post-
apartheid nation and citizenship. It was very alive in the 1940s when the ANC Youth 
League wrested control of the party from an older and more liberal generation of leaders, 
and it was beaten back in the 1950s with the rise to dominance of the moderates again in 
the ANC. Fatima Meer’s analysis of African nationalism reflected the populist appraisal 
of dominance of moderate liberal tendencies. She stated that there was ideological 
confusion during the early nationalist struggle that opened the gate for acceptance of 
political moderation including rejection of black popular culture while accepting 
assimilation of European culture. According to her, this development prevented a militant 
confrontation with white power when its defeat was possible.178   
 
Some ANC leaders like Anton Lembede became the most sophisticated and daring 
theoretician of black liberation. Lembede sought to reconcile modern black nationalism 
with African tradition and to him land reclamation was at the centre of black nationalist 
struggles. He also linked the issue of black liberation with the liberation of black workers 
from exploitation.179 Since the time of the ANC Youth League’s 1944 Congress Youth 
League Manifesto, black intellectuals within the liberation movement began to wrestle 
with competing conceptions of the nation, the people as well as citizenship.180  
  
What happened in South Africa in ideological terms is that the moderate non-racial strand 
of black nationalist liberation thought was found to be pragmatic in the context of the 
South Africa situation and in 1994, it was this strand that won the day. Even the whites 
found this strand accommodative of them. Hence it became in the words of James C. 
Scott the ‘public transcript’ and formed a more acceptable if not highly compromised 
basis of the transition from  apartheid to democracy.  The radical republican Africanist 
thought and vision with its trappings of nativism was relegated to a ‘hidden transcript’—a 
discourse taking place and playing itself beyond the formal political arena.181 Halisi is 
more convincing in his explanation of citizenship struggles and the role of populism in 
South African politics. This is how he put it: 
 
Rival populisms, nourished by competing visions of liberation, are bound to have 
an impact on the evolution of South African citizenship because popular 
democratic traditions, of which populism is one manifestation, are among the 
most durable sources of inspiration for democratic thinkers. After centuries of 
racial domination, it would be unrealistic to expect an ethos of non-racial 
citizenship to prevail unchallenged by older political perceptions. Eventually, the 
black liberation struggle may come to be viewed by all South Africans as a 
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national achievement and, therefore, a cornerstone of non-racial citizenship 
identity; but, for the immediate future, successive governments will have to cope 
with the sensibilities grounded in both non-racial and race politics.182
 
One need to understand the fact that South Africa has the richest and deep rooted populist 
tradition than any other country in Southern Africa born out of the realities of the 
existence of the oldest nationalist party that fought the longest liberation struggle. Black 
intellectuals of South Africa have always reacted to white racial nationalism with their 
own black populist strategies of black liberation, designed to mobilise across class 
divides and ethnic divisions. Ernesto Laclau has noted that populist movements never fail 
to draw on the energies of intellectuals and political elites and to promote solidarities 
across and beyond class binaries.  He adds that populist theories excel in their ability to 
synthesise seemingly contradictory ideas and identities into a pervasive sense of political 
solidarity.183  
 
While populism has mainly emerged as right-or left-wing doctrines, nativism is another 
form in which it emerges in post-colonial Africa. The formation of the Native Club is 
partly building on long-standing black South Africa intellectual tradition that has 
consistently deployed African populist thought syncretically, injecting Africanist thought, 
pan-Africanist thought into Eurocentric traditions. With the fading of PAC, race-
conscious black populism has been gradually accommodated by the ANC and ‘pulsates 
strongly within the ANC.’184  It is no wonder then that the black populist thought that has 
been pushed into a ‘hidden transcript’ by the hegemonic and triumphant ‘public 
transcript’ of non-racialism is publicising itself via the launched of the Native Club. It is 
taking a public stage in the context of an enabling environment infused with Africanist 
philosophies of ubuntu and African Renaissance being pushed forward by the ANC 
government.  It is developing as an intellectual project spearhead by native intellectuariat.    
    
The Native Club, Native Intellectuariat and African Cultural Revival 
There is no event in post-apartheid South Africa that raised animated debate as the 
formation of the Native Club in 2006. As noted by Tom Nevin:  
 
Since its existence became public, the passage of The Native Club, South Africa’s 
latest hot potato, has been baptism of fire. At the outset, it was accused of 
appropriating the politically loaded label ‘native’ for its own ends, more 
controversially, it has been accused of racial exclusivity. Its independence and 
objectivity has also been brought into question, not least due to its apparent 
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patronage by government, although President Thabo Mbeki has more recently 
been at pains to qualify his acceptance of the forum.185
   
According to the Native Club’s official website, it is a public initiative based at the Africa 
Institute of South Africa (AISA), whose prime objective is to mobilise and consolidate 
South African intelligentsia as a social force.186 The call for such a progressive 
intellectual force was initially made by President Thabo Mbeki when he delivered his 
Inaugural Lecture of the Parliamentary Millennium Project, where he raised critical 
issues about how the West distorted African history in its crusade to claim a superior 
position in global governance and history of inventions. Mbeki reminded his audience of 
the achievements and inventions of Africa including how the African civilisation of 
Ancient Egypt invented mathematics and a form of writing and how the Malian 
civilisation culminated in the emergence of Timbuktu as a hub of intellectualism and 
trade. In this lecture, Mbeki alluded to the dangers of neo-liberal imperialism and advised 
that the African struggle: 
 
…is to engage in both the total emancipation of our continent from the social, 
political and economic legacy of colonialism and apartheid as well as to reclaim 
our history, identity and traditions and on the foundation that our ancestors built 
for all of humanity, rebuild our societies to ensure that they are developed and 
prosperous.187
 
Taking an openly Afro-radical position, Mbeki argued that ‘true liberation’ cannot be 
achieved in Africa as long ‘we defer to our former colonisers the matters that affect our 
countries and people.’ He proceeded to make it categorically clear that: ‘We would not 
achieve true liberation as long as we do things merely to be in good books of those who 
are powerful, even when such actions are inimical to the independence and development 
of Africa.’188 In his detailed exposition of challenges facing Africa and Africans at the 
moment, President Mbeki emphasised the urgent need to identify those forces 
constituting the African progressive movement in Africa and devise  innovative ways of 
mobilising such progressive forces to ensure general convergence of views and 
perspectives on Africa in a manner that would accelerate the embers of the African 
Renaissance.189 Mbeki also expressed his concerns about the identity and interests of 
those whose ideas continue to drive African societies in this century. The Native Club 
seems to model itself as this desperately needed progressive African intellectual force or 
is poised to mobilise such a force. Among its key purposes is to ensure greater 
participation by all South Africans in the socio-economic, political and cultural spheres. 
It has four core objectives: to create an environment in which ideas can be disseminated, 
debated and discussed by inquiring minds; to create a congenial climate for reflection and 
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self-examination; to assert itself in the realm of arts, culture, politics and the economy; 
and finally to give a voice to the voiceless.190   
 
While some scholars like Achille Mbembe are of the opinion that Mbeki is one of the 
‘most worldly, cosmopolitan and urbane political leaders modern Africa has ever 
known,’ they risk underestimating his Africanism and strong nationalist allegiance. As 
noted by Patrick Bond, Mbeki is an astute politician able to ‘talk left’ while behaving 
‘right’ in practical political terms.191 Mbeki is able to speak both in Afro-radical language 
and also in clear neo-liberal terms, while remaining a respected nationalist leader in 
Africa and trusted as a ‘new’ crop of democratic leaders at the global level. It is under 
Thabo Mbeki’s leadership that radical Africanist thought has permeated the ANC 
pulsating concurrently and uneasily with the ANC’s tradition of non-racialism. Mbeki is 
one of the pillars of African Renaissance thinking and is a prolific writer in his own right 
as indicated by his contributions to the ANC Today.192 The Native Club becomes 
understood as a presidential initiative and as an ANC project because it seems to have 
been formed as a direct response to Mbeki’s call for a progressive force to sustain the 
African Renaissance and to produce ideas to drive African societies. The second reason is 
that it is partly sponsored by the Department of Arts and Culture (DAC). The third reason 
is that its founding Chairperson is Titus Mafolo who is a personal adviser to President 
Thabo Mbeki.  
 
In its call for papers for the first Native Club Conference under the theme: Where are the 
Natives? The Black Intelligentsia Today, the conveners of wrote that: 
  
The new millennium, with its own set of challenges, is bound to engender a 
new world order (or disorder?), which will require Africans to define 
themselves in terms of their relationship with other people. Above all, this will 
require Africans to sever the shackles of intellectual servitude and work 
towards becoming masters and architects of their own destiny. The term 
‘intelligentsia’ holistically refers to home-grown/local/native African 
intellectuals, meaning those who use their intellectual prowess to further the 
interests of their people, to help create a living socio-economic, political, 
cultural and liberating hegemony. 
 
Throughout lengthy periods of racial dehumanisation and imperialist 
colonialism, Africans have been alienated from indigenous cultural values and 
spirituality, which essentially contributed to shaping a nation. As a result, a 
significant number of African intellectuals find it difficult to think first as 
Africans, whenever they are confronted by issues that impact directly on the 
African perspective, mindset and identity. 
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This is precisely because ‘a quarter century after Africa’s political 
independence from European colonial powers, the colonial mentality still lies 
like a fog on the African consciousness’ (Chinweizu 1987:vii). The ideal of 
the African century will be a mirage without the meaningful participation and 
full de-colonisation of the African intelligentsia, in addressing its separation 
from majority base, defined and despised as the masses. 
 
In as far as South Africa is concerned, the post-1994 context is that of a 
country in the process of fundamental change, from the legacy of apartheid to 
a democratic society grounded in a national cultural identity. 
 
The challenge that the socio-political and economic transformation process 
and nation building project presents to all South Africans, especially the 
intelligentsia, is to seek to define themselves as a new society, and map the 
future. Accordingly, this process is expected to be pursued in a manner that 
will advance a unified cultural identity of South Africa as a country, and also 
enhance cultural, social, and economic development for the benefit of society 
at large.  
 
In spite of transformation in various sectors, there is certainly no evidence of a 
South African intelligentsia emerging as a cohesive force. Whilst in many post 
independent African states, there was a mushrooming of local academics and 
intelligentsia, this has not been the case in South Africa for a number of 
reasons.193  
 
This preamble to the Native Club’s call for papers had to be quoted in extenso because it 
gives some insight into the thinking behind the formation of the Native Club as well as 
the key concerns that drive it.  The following key issues emerge as the central concerns of 
the Native Club namely engagement in the process of definition of African identity; 
mobilisation of South African  intellectual capital in such a strategic way that it serves the 
local interests of the people of South Africa; revival of indigenous African cultural values 
and spirituality as the anchors for shaping the nation and formation of national identity; 
enabling African intelligentsia to participate effectively in the processes of decolonisation 
of the mind; connecting the intelligentsia organically with the African masses; and 
facilitating the take over of the public discourse by black intellectuals in order for them to 
define the contours of the new South African society and map the future direction of 
society.  
 
The first Native Club Conference was well attended and it took place in Tshwane from 
the 3rd to the 4th of May 2006. It was characterised by animated debate and it reflected 
key issues about the direction of transformation, differing perceptions of the role of 
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intellectuals in the political discourse as well as some participants questioning the very 
existence of the Native Club itself. What transpired at the conference and the aftermath of 
the conference partly reflects the differing visions of the democratic transition, the 
differing interpretations of the teleology of the liberation struggle, and the differing 
visions of the nature of South Africa nation and society and the nature of democracy. 
What is interesting to note is that at its Inaugural Native Club Conference, the debate was 
very open even among the so-called native intellectuals, that is those who were invited. 
There were areas of congruence and areas of disagreement. For instance, there was 
agreement on the reality of marginalisation of black intellectual thought within the 
national discourse and the dominance of white neo-liberal thought. The participants 
raised the issue of South African government’s intolerance of criticism and its tendency 
to ‘other’ its critics as counter-revolutionaries and ultra-leftist loonies as well as how 
participation in the struggle for liberation paralysed black intellectuals creating a vacuum 
in the realm of black critical thought. 
 
The issue of use of African frames of thought, civilisation and philosophy as the basis of 
intellectual engagement did not raise much disagreement. However, the issue of 
academic detachment and intellectual autonomy as a virtue of academia fragmented the 
participants and raised a lot of debate. Some participants challenged the notion of 
categorisation of intellectuals into hegemonic intellectuals, organic intellectuals, organic 
subservients, praise-singers, lampoon intellectuals, as well self-declared intellectuals as 
not good for the South African intellectual community. There was agreement on the 
necessity for research on Ubuntu as a major academic concern in its contribution to 
reconciliation and reconstruction. Some participants were very sceptical of what they 
termed black-on-black and native-on-native intellectual battles. Finally some raised the 
issue of the white intellectual establishment having copyright on defining who are the 
credible black intellectuals.194
 
The founding Chairperson of the Native Club Titus Mafolo fired the first bullets that set 
the whole nation ablaze with debate. He raised the issue of cultural decolonisation of the 
minds of South Africans as a very pertinent part of the current struggles in this way: 
 
Colonialism and apartheid left ‘nothing to chance’ as they implanted in natives 
the belief that indigenous thought and philosophy did not belong to the era of 
civilization. To a very large extent, the dominance of neo-liberal ideology in 
South Africa today is testimony to the legacy of 350 years of apartheid 
colonialism. The question is whether we have accepted this hegemony as God-
given?195         
 
Mafolo noted that there was a decline in intellectual engagement by blacks since 1994 
and that the intellectual vacuum has been filled by a small, but ‘well-resourced, organised 
and strategically placed neo-liberals are consistent in trying to shape the form and content 
of the transformation of SA through public discourse, vocal and visible campaigns for 
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their causes and better networking.’196  To him ‘the legacy of the past, which has 
imposed gross material inequalities,’ made it easier for neo-liberals to vocalise their 
concerns. He added that the supporters of the Native Club ‘firmly believed that 
neoliberalism is inimical to the objectives of transformation and national reconstruction, 
at least in terms set and determined by the historically marginalised sections of our 
society.’197  On the purpose of the Native Club, Mafolo stated that: 
 
We seek to build a climate congenial to continued reflection and self-examination 
by the native intelligentsia, asserting itself in the realm of arts and culture, socio-
economy and politics. The SA intelligentsia faces a cardinal responsibility to 
mobilise the weakest and most vulnerable sections of the society to find their 
voices, to live up to its historical obligation of developing and sustaining critical 
consciousness among the people. 
 
We see the scientific, literary and artistic members of our society playing a central 
role in the regeneration of our young people, in the form of creative writing, 
poetry, participating in debates and generally contesting ideas.198
 
Mafolo went on to highlight some of the issues that the Native Club will take on such as 
the reality of the indigenous cultures, languages and social values that are currently in a 
state of paralysis and ‘in a cultural limbo.’ The challenge for the Native Club was to find 
ways of codifying some of the values and traditions from the indigenous past and use 
them in strengthening African societies and nations. Articulating a clearly cultural- 
nationalist thought, Mafolo said: 
 
Though we are Africans, many South Africans seem to have an identity crisis. 
Through our dress, music, cuisine, role models and reference points we seem to 
be clones of Americans and Europeans. The Native Club will grapple with this 
important matter so that there should evolve South Africans who are truly native 
rather than exotic.199
 
Writing in the journal Umrabulo, Mofolo clearly defined the Native Club as ‘the third 
pillar of our transformation,’ focused on cultural revival.  The other two pillars were 
identified as politics and economy. He wrote that: 
 
The Native Club is not an organisation and has no membership. It is a forum, led 
by a small committee that facilitates workshops, discussions and debates around 
different issues and will soon begin research around identified topics. It is a club 
that seeks to encourage on-going critical engagement, especially among blacks, 
around the many and varied matters confronting our transformation.200
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According the Mafolo, the main focus of the Native Club is the area of culture, this 
culture is defined as ‘the totality of inherited ideas, beliefs, philosophies, assumptions, 
values, and knowledge that propel society in a particular direction’201 According to him 
the critical area that requires the intervention of the Native Club is ‘the space of 
knowledge production, which is in the hands of whites, the majority of whom adhere to a 
liberal ideology…As in the economy, whites control and own the means of knowledge 
production and dissemination.’202  
 
Giving details on the three pillars of transformation—politics, economy and culture, 
Mafolo noted that the South African national democratic revolution has made major 
strides  in the arena of politics, dismantling the apartheid political edifice, repealing 
draconian laws and creating a more representative judiciary system as well as entrenching 
civil and political liberties. The second pillar, the economy ‘poses more difficulties than 
that of politics.’ According to Mafolo: 
 
Twelve years after liberation the economy is still firmly in the hands of whites, 
most of whom continue to resist transformation of the economy and had to be 
dragged into the process of economic change through legislation.203
 
The Native Club, however, is not dealing with the economic issues, it is focused on the 
third pillar—culture. At this level, Mafolo notes that South Africa, like other former 
colonies, is dominated by ideas, beliefs, philosophies and assumptions emanating from 
the erstwhile colonial powers. These range from religions such as Christianity to 
ideologies such as liberalism, social democracy and different shades of socialism. The 
Native Club is therefore poised to grapple with the broad issue of identity and respond to 
such questions as: 
 
• Which beliefs and philosophies define South Africans? 
• What world outlook should inform the moulding of a new South Africa? 
• On what philosophies and assumptions should we base our values, ideas and 
knowledge?204 
 
According to Mafolo the South African transition is defined within existing exotic 
dominant global ideologies—‘whether liberal, social democratic or socialist—and adopt a 
negative stance towards anyone suggesting the indigenisation of our revolution.’205 The 
key purpose of the Native Club is to research on ubuntu as an African philosophy of 
governance before the next step of codification. In this analysis of the Native Club, 
Mafolo is joined by Addy Maloka who locates the Native Club within the broader 
national democratic project and the revolutionary traditions of Pan-Africanism, Black 
Consciousness Movement and Negritude as well as Marxism. To Maloka the Native 
Club’s ‘battle-cry being to address the legacy of apartheid in the knowledge production 







sector.’206 In an important article entitled Writing for Them: ‘Radical’ Historiography in 
South Africa and the ‘Radical’ Other,’ Eddy Maloka raised issues concerning general 
disillusionment, feeling of being peripherized and general lack of connection between 
white scholars and black scholars.  If read carefully Maloka’s article encapsulated the key 
issues that would in future create nativist thinking among black intellectuals. Firstly, 
Maloka raised the issue of: ‘The virtual absence of practising black historians—defined 
here in terms of research and publications—in the production of historical knowledge in 
South Africa is generally recognised.’207   While this problem is generally attributed to 
the apartheid construction of Bantu education, repression of black universities and broad 
segregationist policies, Maloka adds that ‘racial and class dynamics within the South 
African academy are themselves equally responsible for the lack of black academics.’208
 
Because of the salience of Maloka’s arguments and their relationship to those that 
culminated in the formation of the Native Club is it vital to pursue them a bit. The de-
throning of the liberal historiography of the 1950s and 1960s was achieved by self-
appointed ‘radical historiography’ with its mantra of ‘history from below.’ It was these 
radicals who quickly proclaimed that by 1994 the decolonisation of South African history 
had been achieved.209  Maloka realises that: ‘Surely, it is too soon to celebrate the 
achievements of the ‘radical’ school, not least because this self-appointed 
‘decolonisation’ mission was a whites-only affair.’210  Even those emerging black 
scholars like  Thomas Nkadimeng and Ted Matsetsela did not rise to the pinnacles of 
South Africa Historiography, with Matsetsela losing his life in the turmoil of liberation 
and his research project appropriated by white radicals and Nkadimeng’s research on 
Transvaal  African sharecroppers ‘did not survive the offensive of powerful ‘radical’ 
historians who not only ran the Oral History Project and its mother body—the Wits 
Workshop—but also commanded resources and contacts within the academy.’ 211 Within 
this environment black South African historians never emerged, and whites like Phil 
Bonner and others are still the gate-keepers of the History Department at the University 
of Witwatersrand. Thirteen years after apartheid the Department is still ‘white.’ Such 
glaring issues of marginalisation of black thought have coalesced over the years to 
produce the Native Club. 
 
At its formation, the Native Club raised the issues of who is producing the knowledge 
being consumed by South Africans. The answer was that a minority of white scholars 
who are well established in different academic disciplines produce knowledge for the 
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majority African population. While knowledge has no colour it is shot through with 
ideologies and even sectarian interests. As noted by Xolani Xundu, the issue of who is 
producing knowledge and the contribution of black academics to knowledge production 
engaged the minds of those who attended the first conference of the Native Club.212 The 
Minister of Arts and Culture, Pallo Jordan invited black intellectuals not only to 
contribute to knowledge production but also to play a leading role in shaping the nature 
of the transformation, emphasising that the national agenda is still full swing and that it 
only needed black intellectuals to play a leading role in the transformation to make sure 
the transformation vision of the ANC-led government became a living idea for all South 
Africans.213  
 
Sandile Memela, a journalist, author and spokesperson for the Ministry of Arts and 
Culture took the debate to another direction, mounting a critique on what he termed 
‘coconut intellectuals: black outside, white inside.’ His list of ‘coconut intellectuals’ 
included Xolela Mangcu, Sipho Seepe, Rhoda Kadalie, Vuyo Mbuli, Tim Modise, 
Themba Sono, Console Tleane, and Aubrey Matshiqi. His key issue was that these black 
scholars spend a lot of time criticising the ANC government and in the process 
reinforcing racist assumptions about black government in order to receive accolades from 
white liberals as fearless, independent and courageous intellectuals.214 Memela argued 
that ‘rather than help and support the democratic government carryout and fulfil its 
mandate, they limit their role to throwing stones at the government.’215 Memela noted 
that: ‘Inside the government, there are intellectuals who are giving their lives to the 
system.’216  
 
What emerges clearly is that the Native Club is an ANC-project, meant to organised 
black intellectuals into a ‘progressive’ force of change. Its nativist outlook reflects the 
surging and pulsating Africanism within the ANC. The second issue to note is that the 
debates on the role of intellectuals in politics and development has occupied some of the 
best minds in Africa leading to the publication of Thandika Mkandawire’s book African 
Intellectuals: Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender and Development.217 This book 
analyses the role of intellectuals in shaping passions, ideologies, national and societal 
visions. The pan-African nationalist agendas were shaped by intellectuals and up to now 
the central role of intellectuals in re-constructing the past, interpreting the present and 
mapping out visions of the future cannot be ignored.218 Mahmood Mamdani justified the 
need for an indigenous intellectuariat in his article entitled ‘There Can Be No African 
Renaissance Without An Africa-focussed Intelligentsia.’219 Raymond Suttner has noted 
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that the ANC has a long legacy of being comprised and backed by ‘collective organic 
intellectuals’ that shaped its direction and made sure its political messages were always 
congruent with the aspirations of compatriots and the grassroots.220
 
However, the transition to democracy led to the strong body of ‘collective organic 
intellectuals’ to fall into disarray as some thought the struggle had been achieved, some 
became government officials and other were taken by the private sector. This has created 
a vacuum that was noted clearly by Eddy Maloka who noted that: ‘During our struggle 
the realm of ideas always stood vigilant behind the barrel of the gun.’221 The vacuum is 
also attributed to  self-censorship, fear of being branded a racist since race card is used to 
discredit people who raise debates as well as the tyranny of political correctness. For 
example to call one a settler or a native is considered to be outside the discourse of 
political correctness and the ethos of the rainbow nation. The Native Club must therefore 
be seen partly as an attempt to assemble an organic indigenous intellectuariat 
accommodative of the political project of the ANC and Mbeki’s African Renaissance. 
This argument was reinforced by Mandla Nkomfe who wrote that: 
 
Every epoch has its own organic intellectuals. Their purpose is always to work 
for the mode of production. The ANC is a collective organic intellectual. It 
must articulate vision, strategy and tactics and the new civilisation of our 
times. This conception can move beyond the ANC to embrace most people in 
society to play the role of organic intellectuals. These should include teachers, 
academics, preachers and civil society formations.222  
 
According to Nkomfe, for a long time the ANC was toying with the idea of an ANC 
Policy Institute as a launching pad to establish linkages with society and public 
intellectuals. The Native Club can partly be explained as emanating from this thinking 
within the ANC. According to Nkomfe, the main challenge is re-direction of academic 
and intellectual efforts to the African cause.223  These view easily dovetail with those of 
the founding Chairperson of the Native Club. 
 
The debate on the Native Club becomes more controversial when one looks at the critics 
of the Club and how they define the initiative. The critics engage first with the use of the 
term ‘native’ as part of the Club’s name. Under apartheid, the word native was 
transformed into an insult, ‘a way to describe and demean black people.’224 It ranked 
with such other terms as Negro, nigger and kaffir that denoted black people as inferior, 
irresponsible and uncivilised.  At the colonial legal level that was permeated through and 
through by race, the term native distinguished white Europeans settlers from indigenous 
inhabitants and also entailed deprivation of rights to natives and conferment of the same 
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to the white settlers.225 In a previously racially divided society like South Africa still 
engaged in democratic transition, when one racial group begins to appropriate the term 
native to itself, the other racial groups are quicker to panic over their citizenship status. 
The term conjures up the colonial binaries of settlers and natives. This is the context 
within which the Native Club provoked racial interpretations. It is within this context that 
criticism of the Native Club took the form of ‘black-on-black’ intellectual battles as well 
as what the Executive Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution at the University of 
Cape Town, Adekeye Adebajo referred to as ‘interracial verbal violence.’226  South 
Africans are very sensitive about race branding because racism is still alive and the 
memories of institutionalised racism are still alive. 
 
It is no wonder then that when the Native Club was formed with a once pejorative title, 
South Africans were quickly reminded of the Afrikaner-Broeberbond (Afrikaner 
Brotherhood), a secret society established in 1918 for the purpose of countering the 
humiliating defeat of the Afrikaners by the British in the South African War of 1899-
1902. Through the Broederbond, Afrikaner men hoped to foster Afrikaner culture and 
traditions in the face of ill-treatment by British South Africans and their perceived 
reduction to second class citizenship. The Broederbond’s silent network was considered 
to have been instrumental in the final rise of Afrikaner nationalism and the victory of 
Afrikaner National Party of South Africa in 1948 that authored apartheid policy.227 The 
Native Club is severely criticised for being as exclusivist as the Afrikaner Brotherhood. 
However, its Chairman, Mafolo has reiterated that the Native Club has no membership. 
President Thabo Mbeki has told parliament that ‘I hope I would find in its ranks the 
Afrikaners…who hoped that one day they would have the possibility to proclaim that 
they were proudly South African and African natives.’228  
 
If analysed as a government and a state initiative the formation of the Native Club could 
be seen legally as a violation of the South African Constitution particularly Chapter 2 of 
the Bill of Rights which states categorically clear that the state ‘may not unfairly 
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone’ on any grounds including race, ethnic 
or social origin, colour, cultural, language or birth. However, there were fewer legal 
critiques of the Native Club perhaps because the same constitution allows for freedom of 
association, assembly and expression.  However the formation of the Native Club and its 
association with the ruling ANC raised serious questions at the political level, mainly 
from the white dominated opposition Democratic Alliance (DA). The DA national 
spokesman Motlatjo Thetjeng was quick to blame the ANC in connection with the 
formation of the Native Club: 
 
The problem facing the ANC is that its ‘democratic, non-sexist, non-racial’ 
political programme is hypocritical in a number of ways, not least of all being that 
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fact that it defines people first and foremost by their race, relegating all other 
considerations to afterthoughts. As the state fails to deliver, as a few are enriched 
at the expense of the many and as the state undermines individual rights and 
freedoms, the veneer is getting rubbed away and South Africans are beginning to 
see the ANC for what it really is.229
 
The DA submitted the following parliamentary questions to President Mbeki to gain 
clarity on these issues:  
 
• Whether the Native Club, as a presidential initiative, is a government-funded 
initiative; if not, what are the relevant details; if so: 
 (a) Which government department provides funding for the Native Club? 
 (b) How much money has been budgeted for the Native Club? 
 ©  What qualifies a person to gain membership of the Native Club? 
• Whether there are any racially-defined limitations on membership of the Native 
Club, if so, which population groups are excluded from becoming members of 
the Native Club; if not, why was a name with clear racial connotations chosen 
for the club? 
• Whether the Presidency agrees with a delegate [name furnished] at the inaugural 
meeting of the Native Club that the South Africa academic community is divided 
into native and settler intellectuals? 
• Why was former ANC MP and current advisor to the President, Mr Titus 
Mafolo, appointed as Chairperson of the Native Club?230  
 
The DA concluded the Native Club was certainly racially divisive, that its association 
with the Presidency threatened academic freedom, that South Africa did not have space 
for a class of praise-singing intellectuals and that ‘Only rigorous, fearless and open 
debate between independent thinkers of all races will enable us to tackle the 
developmental challenges that our country faces.’231 Mbeki responded to these queries by 
stating that as a native South African he would himself consider taking part in the Native 
Club activities and he urged the Afrikaners who are proud of being native South Africans 
to rise to the occasion and enlist with the Native Club too. 
 
Debates on the Native Club raises other crucial aspects, including the issue of the ability 
of African intellectuals to ‘speak truth to power’ lies behind the whole intellectual 
struggles for academic freedom. Those who associate themselves with power end up as 
‘purveyors of apologetics or sycophants.’232  Since South Africa gained its 
‘independence’ from apartheid recently in 1994, many African intellectuals have warned 
South African intellectuals to avoid coming too close to power and maintain a safe 
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distance from the ruling political elites. At the moment it is not clear whether the Native 
Club will be able to ‘speak truth to power.’233
 
Raising the debate to the continental level, the reality is that the so-called ‘native’ 
intellectuals were all socialised in Western universities, Western intellectual traditions 
and Western epistemology. Together with the current African leadership, they suffer 
from what the philosopher Paulin Hountodji termed ‘theoretical extroversion’ 
characterised by the ‘feverish importation of paradigms, problematics and perspectives’ 
by the native intellectuals.234 The key crisis for the African intellectual is that of being 
ensnared in Western epistemological tradition. The Native Club’s desire to formulate 
indigenous knowledge cannot succeed without a radical epistemological rebellion. 
Perhaps the rebellion must start from abandoning colonial languages as a mode of 
communicating and articulating African issues. The problem faced by the native 
intellectual and the native politician is well-defined by Paul Tiyambe Zeleza in terms of a 
group that suffered from double consciousness because they both straddled, often 
uneasily, coloniality and its modernist claims and nativity and is supposed atavism. This 
intelligentsia felt comfortable neither with Africa (which bred them) nor with Europe and 
America (which they were socialised to admire). Their current identity is bifurcated into 
and marked by the serious crisis of talking and dreaming in both indigenous and imported 
languages.235 These issues are intertwined with the politics of identity. It is a big crisis 
that breeds nativism among some intellectuals. For example, Ngugi wa Thiong’o took a 
purely nativist line in his attempt to achieve what he referred to as the ‘decolonisation of 
the mind.’  This involved  a ‘writing style rebellion’ ranged against the use of English 
language and other colonial languages like French, Portuguese and Spanish. Ngugi wa 
Thiong’o took the lead in the form of translating his novels into Gikuyu and he began to 
write others in Gikuyu.236
 
The point here is that the Native Club cannot make sense until one delves deeper into the 
trials, travails and tribulations of African political thought and the twist, turns, 
undulations, fragmentations, ambiguities, ambivalences and contradictions of the 
nationalist liberation struggles. The search for identity in Africa is still a major issue. This 
is a point made poignantly by Chinua Achebe: 
 
African identity is in the making. There isn’t a final identity that is African. But at 
the same time, there is an identity coming into existence. And it has a certain 
context and meaning.237  
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The search for identity is inextricably intertwined with the search for ideology to guide 
South Africa in this crucial phase of democratic consolidation. The ANC can no longer 
manage to continue operating in a omnibus hegemonic style and standing as a ‘universal 
church’ where pagans, heathens, monotheists, animists etc co-exist united by the goal of 
constructing a rainbow nation. This take us to the current issues within the ANC and the 
broader South Africa society and how they are replays of earlier debates about the nature 
of the liberation revolution, nature of democracy, nature of leadership, nature of the 
nation and nature of transformation.     
 
‘Bring My Machine Gun’: ANC, Zuma and the Power of Populism 
The beleaguered Deputy President of the ANC Jacob Zuma has continued with his 
popular hit song Leth’ umshini wami (Bring My Machine Gun) every time he meets his 
supporters. This is not just a song that Zuma selected randomly from the numerous other 
liberation war songs. It has a meaning in the context of the stage at which the national 
democratic revolution led by the ANC is at. It is at a crisis point, revealing once more 
glaring class positions and ideological cleavages, involving the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU), the South Africa Communist Party (SACP) and the 
ANC itself, with all of them operating under a Tripartite Alliance. Looked at from the 
perspective of Antonio Gramsci and Stuart Hall pivoted on the concept of articulation 
and re-articulation, the Jacob Zuma and his supporters represent the long existing but 
hidden populist re-articulation of the national democratic revolution.238 Articulation 
refers to giving expression to something as well as the production of meaning through 
language. Zuma is communicating something through the metaphor of the machine gun 
and his constant cry for his machine gun. The popularity of Zuma is based on his ability 
to connect with the masses who are suffering from a popular sense of betrayal by the 
elitist black bourgeois who came to power in 1994. The ANC is accused mainly by its 
partner, the SACP of adopting capitalist tendencies and of serving narrow self-interests of 
an emerging black capitalist stratum at the expense of the ordinary peasants and 
workers.239  As noted by Neville Alexander, the race-class debate in South Africa is 
refusing to go away and one can add that it then continues to re-ignite memories of 
revolution and continuation of the struggle.240 Gramsci wrote that what is needed in 
transcending existing ‘common sense’ ‘is not a question of introducing from scratch a 
scientific form of thought into everyone’s individual life, but of renovating and making 
‘critical’ and already existing activity.’241  The second decade of democracy unfolded 
against a bedrock of existence of frustrated multiple constituencies about the fruits of the 
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national democratic revolution, feeding into a popular sense of betrayal. The popularity 
of Zuma is located in this fertile ground. What we are witnessing in South Africa is what 
Gillian Hart terms ‘coming together of a politics of grievance and resentment.’242  
 
The bizarre combination of the stress of joblessness, poverty, transport problems, crime, 
poor service delivery, disease as well as racism, mixed with pressure on the leadership to 
give real substance to the model of a new state—this is generating a re-thinking of the 
content of neo-liberal democracy, civic conception of the nation and civic conception of 
citizenship with all the complex issues of rights, equality, and justice. The time has come 
for South Africans to reflect seriously on the indigenisation of their revolution and their 
transformation because the ‘natives’ are now very ‘restless’ and the whites are once more 
referred to as ‘settlers’ leading to general panic.243  Jonathan D. Jansen, the Dean of 
Education at the University of Pretoria has rightly noted that: 
 
Yet we should not fool each other that just below the epidermis of our 
conciliatory politics lies a growing level of racialised anger, resentment, 
alienation and fear among many South Africans...Anyone with doubts about this 
should read the entries on the so-called Friends of Jacob Zuma website to see the 
animosity raised by Zulu against Xhosa; or tune-in to the Cape Town’s call-in 
radio stations after a more qualified Coloured man was allegedly overlooked in 
favour of an African man for a job at Eskom; or listen to Radio Pretoria’s mode of 
reporting in heightened (and often exaggerated) emotional tones about the almost 
daily murders of farming families in the rural heartland at the hands of black 
men.244
 
The puzzling key question is why there is all this restlessness in the midst of a successful 
and robust economy. Achille Mbembe describes the puzzle in this revealing way: 
  
Many poor whites are growing resentful. White professionals who genuinely want 
to belong are called ‘settlers.’ At the same time, many young blacks are angry. 
They feel victimised by their own government. They still cannot get even crumbs 
from the gluttonous feast going around them—the economy growing at more than 
3% a year; the minister of finance triumphantly announcing tax breaks; the 
governor of the Reserve Bank gloating about the low level of inflation. In the 
middle of huge commercial emporium South Africa has become, their own 
experience is still one of joblessness, hunger, pestilence and disease. Who is to be 
blamed if they conduct their lives with deep suspicion, that after all, liberation 
might have been but cynical ploy to keep them where they have been? 
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Such is the context that has created a desperate yearning of salvation by some 
heroic maprofeti eager to get back his machine-gun at a time when other nations 
compete with their knowledge and technologies.245
 
However, to reduce Jacob Zuma to a mere maprofeti inviting South Africans to commit 
political suicide is to misunderstand the key contours of the South Africa liberation 
revolution as well as the role of populism as an ideology in South African liberation 
politics. The problem is not Zuma. The problem is deep rooted in the ANC history and its 
omnibus modus operandi. What does the ANC stand for now? What form or forms of 
political thinking is/are dominant within the ANC? Can the centre of the ANC hold or 
things are falling apart?  
 
A leading Marxist scholar and anti-apartheid activist, Harold Wolpe creatively deployed 
the concept of articulation of modes of production and predicated that the national 
democratic revolution itself will be the site of intense struggles, conflicts and 
contestations.246 South African and the ANC are at that stage at this moment, symbolised 
by emerging cracks not only within the ephemeral Tripartite Alliance but within the 
centre of the ANC itself as a liberation movement. The ANC as noted in the previous 
sections of this study has always contained within itself multiple articulation of the 
democratic national revolution since its formation in 1912. After 1994, it tried to contain 
popular mobilization and worked to articulate interests of different races and classes 
utilising popular undertones of African nationalism. It tried to embody within itself 
different histories, different memories, and different meanings of freedom as anchorages 
of the rainbow nation, hence its image as a broad church. As noted by Gillian Hart, the 
ANC has tried to deploy a common conception of the national democratic revolution and 
was quick to use its own definition of the revolution to ‘other’ and discipline others as 
‘ultra-leftist’ or even counter-revolutionaries.247 The ANC also appropriated popular 
discourses  and popular rhetoric to silence such formations as the PAC.248
 
Mbembe partly responded to some of these issues after raising three main challenges: 
 
• How to foster a genuine commitment to the democratic premise that common 
men and women have something valuable to contribute to the formation of the 
public opinion? 
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• How to contain populism in the safer channels of electoral politics? 
• How to recapture the ideal of non-racialism and attend to all South African 
citizens, black and white, in a resolute attempt to build, for the first time on this 
continent, a truly modern and cosmopolitan society?249 
 
Neo-liberal democracy is not well suited to address issue number one raised by Mbembe. 
It is elitist by its very ontology. Worse still when it is adopted in a society that has been 
riddled by racial inequalities and dispossession of one racial group by the other, it tends 
to paper over these historical inequalities. The second challenge is of how to contain 
populism by confining it to electoral politics. Kenneth Anderson defined populism as ‘a 
sensibility inculcated into class over a long period of time by a form of production.’250 
No mere chimera, the popularity of Zuma among workers, dramatises a deep seated 
populist ideology that has always existed within the ANC that was committed to the 
complete decolonisation of South Africa. It had two strands. The first strand is deeply 
Africanist and its teleology is the transformation of South Africa into a black republic, 
involving changing all colonial and apartheid names and replacing them with purely 
African names of pre-colonial as well as those of fallen  heroes of the liberation struggle. 
In this black republic African culture, African history and African values must occupy the 
centre stage. The black intellectual will determined and shape the public discourse.  
 
The second strand is Afro-Marxist in orientation, and it consists of a two stage revolution. 
The negotiated settlement of 1994 was the first stage of the revolution where the black 
and white bourgeoisie accommodate each other, forgive each other, promise the rest of 
the people reconciliation and unity that papers over material inequalities. It is a necessary 
stage but not the teleology of the national democratic revolution. This is the stage of 
black bourgeois liberation, but does not include the liberation of the masses (the workers 
and peasants). Hence, the need for a second revolution now crystallising around the 
worker and peasant concerns and ranged against the bourgeoisie. A few revolutionary 
elements from the bourgeois class who are prepared to commit class suicide in the 
Fanonian and Cabralian sense, would work together with workers and peasants to achieve 
true liberation and the revolution comes to an end.  
It is in this context of the ANC struggle that one finds Jacob Zuma very loyal to the 
movement, prophesying that he is prepared to take any task assigned to him by the ANC. 
Zuma represents no millenarian fatal thought but a strong populist thought existing within 
the ANC. The ANC has survived through a judicious and strategic deployment of a 
combination of populism and pragmatism. Gillian Hart sees Zuma representing a populist 
move not only to appropriate the national democratic revolution as the rightful heir, but 
also the traditional tendency of the ANC to articulate multiple and often contradictory 
meanings of liberation.251 This he does at a number of levels. Firstly, masquerading and 
asserting himself as a leftist representative. Secondly, as a son of the soil, a man of the 
people and loyal traditionalist who dons leopard skins on key national occasions. Thirdly, 
he made reference to his lack of Western education and in the process digging a niche for 
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himself as connected to the masses as opposed to the highly educated elites. All these are 
strategic articulations of race, class, culture and nationalism in a very creative and 
populist ways. The whole Tripartite Alliance is shaking as the embers of black populism 
gain momentum within the ANC. As a solution, Achille Mbembe suggests that the 
alliance be disbanded but to an ANC that has a strong tradition of operating as a 
hegemonic organisation, Mbembe’s suggestion is not palatable. But Mbembe states his 
point this way: 
 
The so-called ‘tripartite alliance’ (of the ANC, the SACP, and the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions [COSATU] has outrun its usefulness. It is now 
becoming a major factor of instability for the country. It would be in South 
Africa’s national interest for it to disband.252  
 
The people of South Africa’s particularly the poor people’s frustrations and anger 
indicates many directions that are not so clear now. Zuma-ism is making full use of 
resentment and grievance, with the figure of Zuma himself being a point of reference of a 
cockpit and vortex of multiplicity of tensions, anger and discontents swelling and 
enveloping the South African society at large.253 In this broad set of things,  Leth’umshini 
wami becomes a popular call to Aluta Continua (the continuation of the struggle). Those 
cadres within the ANC that have supported and continue to support  the populists strand 
of liberation are of the opinion that the revolution has been hijacked by a bourgeois class 
that is not fully committed to complete decolonisation of South Africa. Why they support 
Zuma is that they think those with a populist Africanist thought are being persecuted by 
those who have abandoned the struggle of the workers and the peasants and who have 
entered into concubinage with the exploiters of yester-years. The second line in the song 
is Uyang’badezela (you are oppressing me). It is also telling and meaningful to those 
subscribing to the teleology of the South Africa liberation in popular revolution, breaking 
both class and racial domination. 
 
A leading African historian, Paul Tiyambe Zeleza has argued that South Africa has much 
to learn from what has transpired in Africa since achievement of independence. He writes 
that: ‘We have all witnessed the destructive power of populist demagoguery. The Zuma 
phenomenon smacks of a desperate populist search for a more workable future.’254 
Zeleza also notes that the support Zuma is receiving is a reflection of creeping 
dissatisfaction by important social constituencies within the post-apartheid dispensation 
and a struggle not only for the soul of the ANC, but the country as a whole.255 According 
to Zeleza:  
 
The Zuma saga is embedded in and reflects at least four interrelated dynamics in 
South Africa’s contemporary political economy and socio-cultural terrain: 
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fractures within the ANC alliance, the centrifugal forces of class, ethnicity, and 
gender. The cracks within the ANC coalition are born out of the overwhelming 
dominance of the ANC, the difficult transition from the commandist politics of a 
liberation movement, the accumulative imperatives of the new black bourgeoisie, 
and the challenge of transformation.256
 
Yes, South Africa is currently at a crucial phase of its political evolution, a phase which 
is dominated by attempts to consolidate democracy as well as by doubts on democracy, a 
phase of taking stock of the first decade of democracy as well as frustrated hopes that are 
calling for a new re-imagination of the mode of governance, a phase where South Africa 
is expected to settle into normalcy of ordinary politics as well as new questioning and 
rethinking of suitability and sustainability of the compromise of 1994. At this moment in 
time race-conscious populism is pulsating strongly within the ANC, giving birth to such 
formations as the Native Club and feeding broader populist and Africanist thinking.    
 
Conclusion 
Two broad views emerge from any analysis of the post-apartheid South Africa. One can 
either take a broadly celebratory and very optimist view of this Southern African country. 
In this positive perspective, one can point to a successful transition from apartheid to 
democracy, to an admirable democratic constitution guaranteeing expansive freedoms, 
admirable level of industrial development, endowment with minerals, a rapidly growing 
and robust economy, emergence of black bourgeoisie that now reach two million (10% of 
adult black population), peaceful democratic electoral practice, commendable efforts at 
gender mainstreaming at government level, robust civil society capable of keeping the 
state accountable, rich multicultural society, and of course one can celebrate the reality of 
South Africa hosting the World Cup in 2010, the first African country to be so honoured  
to host this momentous global sporting event. South Africa is playing a leading role in 
conflict resolution in Africa. South Africa is also blessed in being the home of the doyen 
and living icon of African liberation struggle and globally respected fighter for 
democracy and human rights in the person of Nelson Rolihlahla ‘Madiba’ Mandela. In 
addition, the current president Thabo Mbeki has proven to be an intellectually astute 
leader who clearly understands global politics and global developments and has kept the 
South African economy in a very robust state. But underneath this veneer of a successful 
society are numerable problems, warranting a second perspective that is not so rosy if not 
at all conjuring up pessimistic view of the same society. South Africa has the sharpest 
socio-economic inequalities in the world that led President Mbeki to talk of two 
economies in one country. South Africa has a very high rate of crime and sexual 
violence, making the citizens live in perpetual fear for their lives and properties. Rural 
and urban poverty is high among black citizens. Racial and ethnic tensions loom large, 
punctuated by rabid xenophobia. There is high levels of impatience among the blacks 
about the rate of change breeding dangerous restlessness. Rate of HIV/AIDS infection is 
reaching genocidal levels only second to India, making life very gloom for the poor 
workers and poor peasants. Mbembe has described these negatives of South Africa 
society in this way: 
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A growing chorus of discontent is swelling from multitudes of disadvantaged and 
disaffected poor young black men, many of whom firmly believe in the craft of 
witches and occult forces. How can it be otherwise? Their life expectancy is fast 
diminishing. They hardly trust the constitution. They deeply resent the new rights 
granted to women. Often, they will use rape as a means to discipline them while 
compensating for their own perceived loss of power. With nothing to lose, it is 
easy for many to choose predatory behaviour over political life.  
 
From all corners, they are surrounded by death. In fact, today’s Aids pandemic is 
not unlike yesterday’s lung-sickness. Just as yesterday’s cattle, today’s poor 
blacks are dying in a particularly horrible manner. They cough and gasp for air. 
Fluid creeps over their lungs and as the disease spreads, they putrefy from inside. 
Unable to eat, they are wasted and die mere skeletons. All over the country, 
cemeteries are full. Who can reasonably argue that such a frightening scale of 
death, such a racialised way of dying, does not have radical implications for 
politics and culture? 
 
This is the context in which a class-oriented millenarianism and nativism are 
fuelling mass disillusion, if not outright discontent. The discontent is spearheaded 
by the trade unions, the ANC Youth League and the South Africa Communist 
Party (SACP).257  
 
I differ with Mbembe on the point that class-oriented millenarianism and nativism are 
fuelling disillusionment and that SACP, COSATU and ANC Youth League are 
spearheading discontent. Nativism is a product rather than a cause of disillusionment. 
SACP, COSATU and ANC Youth League are not spearheading discontent, but are 
articulating realities of poverty and disease among the poor.  
 
Instead of buying into the thesis of a class-oriented millenarianism in South Africa, this 
study has deployed a historical approach to demonstrate that the embers of populist 
Africanist-oriented thought was just a hidden transcript lurking underneath the temporal, 
triumphant and public transcript of non-racialism. Now that the ANC is cut-across by 
some ideological fault-line pitting the reformist policies of neo-liberalism and its mantra 
of creating a black middle-class against the resurgent radical, populist and Africanist bloc 
wedded to the liberation war-time vision of structural transformation and empowerment 
of the working class, the populist and nativist hidden transcript is coming to the centre of 
African politics. The SACP, COSATU and ANC Youth League is swelled by this crop of 
radicals.  President Thabo Mbeki  is standing astride and uneasily across these fault-lines 
demonstrated by his controversial stance on AIDS, his two nations thesis on the 
economy, his drive for African Renaissance and his support for the Native Club, and 
some of his purely Africanist ‘intellectual’ writings and public political lectures. 
 
On the way forward for South Africa, Mbembe thinks that the tripartite alliance must be 
disbanded since it is causing instability within the ANC and the country at large. 
Secondly, he thinks that a new political mainstream commitment to a liberal constitution, 
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social democratic agenda and Afropolitan cultural project should emerge. Finally, he call 
for electoral reforms in which people directly elects the president of the country and that 
parliamentarians and other representative bodies should be elected by constituencies.258  I 
think the way forward lies beyond these formalities of liberal democracy. Structural 
changes rather that piecemeal reformist approaches that end up preserving the status quo 
of white privilege are needed to save the country from tension and conflict. The problem 
is economic in character. A more equitable redistribution of economic resources regime 
should be re-negotiated for the sake of the nation. The nativist spirit with its politics of 
indigeneity/nativity as the basis of citizenship and entitlement to resources is in reality an 
economic struggle as well as a power struggle. A formula for addressing poverty among 
the blacks will sweep away ‘native restlessness’ and secure the smooth development of 
the country. As noted by Zelela, the ANC has a long distinguished  history of rising to 
new challenges and weathering storms, one only hopes that it will use its experience to 
mediate the fault-lines and keep the country together without succumbing to 
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